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PURSUANT TO RULE 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner 
Jodi Howick ("Howick") submits this brief 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final action or order of 
the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106(6) (2007). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Howick presents the following issues for review by this Court: 
I. Whether the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board (the "Board") 
abused its discretion when it determined that Howick was not entitled to the 
protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007) because she was allegedly an 
at-will employee under the law.1 The standard for appellate review of this issue is 
de novo for correctness pursuant to Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, f 
11,122 P.3d 521. This issue was preserved by Howick's Notice of Appeal filed 
July 1,2008. 
II. Whether the Board abused its discretion by violating, and in effect 
upholding a violation of, Howick's due process rights pursuant to the Utah 
Constitution Article 1, § 7. The standard for appellate review of this issue is de 
novo for correctness pursuant to Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
References to codes, ordinances, policies and procedures in this Brief refer to 
those in effect in 2007. 
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23, 27 (Utah App. 1991). This issue was preserved by Howick's Notice of Appeal 
filed July 1,2008. 
III. Whether Howick is entitled to attorney fees and costs under this 
Court's inherent power in the interest of justice and equity and under the due 
process provisions of the Utah Constitution. The standard for appellate review of 
attorney fees issues constitutes a matter within this Court's discretion pursuant to 
Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 781-782 (Utah 1994); 
Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT App 22, U 10, 177 P.3d 621; and 
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County School Dist, 2000 UT 87, If 20, 
16 P.3d 533. This issue could not be raised in the proceeding before the Board 
because it is without authority to award fees. Salt Lake City Employee Appeals 
Board Procedures I, C (the "Procedures"), attached as Appendix 2. 
LAWS TO BE INTERPRETED 
The following are constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal. The full text of the following citations is set forth in 
Appendix 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2007). 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007). 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-702, 815 and 1221 (2007). 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 2.52.130 (2007). 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE §§ 2.53.020, 030 and 060 (2007). 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, POLICY 3.01.02 (2007). 
Utah Constitution Article 1, § 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board denying Ho wick an appeal 
from the termination of her employment by the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
in August 2007. The Utah Municipal Code requires cities to provide all but a few 
categories of municipal employees an appeal if their employment is terminated. 
Ho wick believed she was entitled to the protections of the Code, but the City 
rebuffed her efforts to have the termination reconsidered. When Howick first 
attempted to obtain a hearing before the Board, the Salt Lake City Labor Relations 
Officer refused to forward her appeal to the Board on the grounds that Howick 
was working in an alleged "at-will" position and was therefore not entitled to 
appeal to the Board. 
Howick appealed the City's determination to this Court. This Court 
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Howick's appeal because the Board 
had not issued a final action due to the City's refusal to forward her appeal to the 
Board. However, this Court noted that Howick could seek redress through an 
extraordinary writ or other action to require the Board to determine whether it had 
jurisdiction to hear her appeal. 
Upon receipt of this Court's decision, the City forwarded Howick's appeal 
to the Board. In response, the Board sought a legal opinion about whether 
Howick's position was an at-will position. Without considering any of Howick's 
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legal arguments demonstrating that her position could not be made at-will by the 
City, the Board decided that she was an at-will employee and not entitled to an 
appeal. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Howick was employed by the City in the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
("Attorney's Office") from 1992 to August 2007 as a staff attorney. R. 108-130. 
In 1998, the Attorney's Office purported to create a new "at-will" attorney 
position outside of the City's merit system. Staff attorneys were asked to agree to 
move to the newly-created position in exchange for a raise in pay. Howick moved 
to this position and signed a document titled "At-Will Employment Disclaimer" in 
connection with the move. R. 63. 
The newly-created position was titled "Appointed Senior City Attorney." 
The job description for the new position is substantially identical to the City's 
"Senior City Attorney" job description in its 600 Series Compensation Plan, 
except that the "Appointed Senior City Attorney" description requires two 
additional years of experience as a prerequisite for moving to that position and 
identifies it as an at-will position. This new position was originally included as a 
part of the City's 600 Series Compensation Plan and was moved a few years later 
to a newly-created pay plan called the Unclassified Compensation Plan. Most 
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staff attorneys in the Attorney's Office work under the "Appointed Senior City 
Attorney" job description.2 R. 48, 65-68 
During her 15 years of service, Ho wick worked with many different City 
managers and received outstanding performance evaluations. R. 110-130. Then 
in August 2007, Ho wick's supervisor, Ed Rutan ("Rutan"), City Attorney, 
terminated her employment without any prior notice and without any cause 
explicitly on the basis of her alleged at-will status and in violation of the 
protections afforded to merit system employees by the Utah Municipal Code. 
Rutan gave Howick no documentation. R. 108. Ho wick believed that her 
termination violated the requirements of the Utah Municipal Code and asked 
several times to meet with Rutan to discuss the basis of his action. However, 
Rutan refused to meet with her. R. 48; Petitioner's Docketing Statement, Case No. 
20070863, attached as Appendix 4, at Exhibit B. 
City compensation plans and job descriptions are available at 
http://www.slcgov.com/iobs. In July, 2008, the City changed its compensation 
plans to place its Unclassified Compensation Plan in its Executive Compensation 
Plan. See June 3, 2008 Salt Lake City Council Staff Report 
www.slcgov.com/council/agendas (follow "June" hyperlink; then follow "Item 
A10 Compensation Budget FY 08 09" hyperlink under the June 3, 2008 Staff 
Report Attachments heading (last visited October 1, 2008)), attached as Appendix 
3. See also Executive Compensation Plan (sections I, II, III, XVI, XVII and App. 
A) www.slcgov.com/iobs (follow "City Compensation Plans" hyperlink; then 
search for "Appointed Compensation"; follow match 6 hyperlink "Compensation 
Plan for Salt Lake City Corporation Appointed Employees and Elected Officials 
(last visited October 1, 2008)), also attached as Appendix 3. The "Appointed 
Senior City Attorney" job description is currently classified under the Executive 
Compensation Plan as "Level 003." See Executive Compensation Plan, Appendix 
3. The former Unclassified Compensation Plan is publicly available through the 
Salt Lake City recorder's Office. 
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On September 10, 2007, after being rebuffed in her efforts to discuss the 
basis for her termination, including the legality of treating her as an at-will 
employee, Howick filed a Notice of Appeal with the Salt Lake City Recorder to 
obtain an appeal before the Board as required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106(3)(a) and City ordinances and procedures. R. 108-130. The City's Labor 
Relations Officer, who staffs the Board in the appeal process, refused to initiate 
the appeal process and instead obtained information relating to Howick's former 
position in the Attorney's Office. The Labor Relations Officer's supervisor, as the 
City's acting Labor Relations Officer, then issued a letter stating that she had 
"determined" that Howick was an at-will employee and therefore not entitled to an 
appeal. Appendix 4, Exhibits A and B. Howick contacted the City pointing out 
that the Labor Relations Officer's action was contrary to both State law and City 
ordinance and policy, but the City refused to refer Howick's appeal to the Board. 
Appendix 4, Exhibits B and C. 
On October 22, 2007, Howick filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Case 
No. 20070863, Notice of Appeal. The Court made a sua sponte Motion for 
Summary Disposition to determine if it had jurisdiction over the appeal. The 
Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Howick's appeal because of the 
refusal of the City to refer Howick's appeal to the Board. The Court dismissed 
Howick's appeal, but noted in its decision that the City's handling of Howick's 
appeal to the Board violated the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board 
Procedures (the "Procedures") and that Howick could seek redress through an 
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extraordinary writ or other action to require the Board to issue a final agency 
decision on its own jurisdiction. See Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT 
App 216, 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 212. 
Upon receipt of this Court's decision, the City referred Howick's appeal to 
the Board. The Board acknowledged receipt of the appeal on June 20, 2008. 
R. 104. The Board informed Howick and the City that they could submit 
documentation related to Howick's appeal for consideration at the Board's 
meeting on June 26, 2008, but the Board permitted Howick no other participation 
in its process. R. 74-76, 99-101, 104. Howick submitted a memorandum of law 
arguing that she was entitled to the protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 
because her staff attorney position could not lawfully be made an at-will position. 
R. 47-68. The City submitted a letter arguing that a court, and not the Board, 
should determine whether Howick could be treated by the City as an at-will 
employee. R. 27-46. 
On July 1, 2008, pursuant to its Procedures, the Board requested a legal 
opinion regarding whether Howick was properly classified as an at-will employee 
from the City Attorney. R. 96; Procedures III.G at Appendix 2. The City 
Attorney retained special counsel of his choosing, Stanley Preston ("Preston"), to 
provide the requested opinion. R. 94-95. The opinion found that Howick's 
position could legally be classified as an at-will position without addressing 
Howick's legal contentions regarding the City's authority and the requirements of 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 ("Section 10-3-1105") and 1106 ("Section 10-3-
1106"). R. 81-87. 
On July 15, 2008, in a meeting lasting approximately two minutes, three of 
five members of the Board met and decided to adopt the conclusions of the special 
counsel selected by the City Attorney. R. Exhibit A at 2-3. The Board decided 
that based on Ho wick's alleged at-will status, she was not entitled to the 
protections of Section 10-3-1106, thereby upholding the at-will termination of 
Howick's employment. R. Exhibit A at 3. The Board certified its decision to the 
Salt Lake City Recorder on July 15, 2008, R. 73, and Howick filed a Notice of 
Appeal to this Court on July 18, 2008. 
The Board met in closed sessions. R. 99-101; 74-76. Howick was 
permitted no participation in the proceedings before the Board, other than 
submitting her memorandum. She was not given access to the Preston opinion 
until Board staff provided Howick with a copy of the record on August 7, 2008, 
three weeks after the Board's decision. Letter from Shelly Chapman, Salt Lake 
City Corporation, August 7, 2008, attached as Appendix 5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Board abused its discretion when it determined that Howick was 
not entitled to the protections of Section 10-3-1106. Rather, the City exceeded the 
statutory authority granted to it under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 and violated 
the Utah Municipal Code and City requirements when it classified Howick's 
employment at-will, terminated her employment on the basis of this alleged at-will 
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status and denied her the protections of Section 10-3-1106. The City cannot 
violate or exceed its authority under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 by any means, 
whether by ordinance, policy, procedure or contract, and it cannot circumvent the 
requirements of its own ordinances mandating that the City follow these statutes. 
Consistent with this Court's previous determinations, municipal actions that 
exceed their authority are void and cannot be given any effect. The City was 
obligated to comply with statutory provisions in its rules and in its dealings with 
its employees, and Howick had the right to expect that the City would. The Board 
decision should therefore be reversed and Howick should be reinstated and 
awarded back pay and benefits. 
II. The City, the Board, and the Board staff also violated Howick's 
rights to due process. Howick had a property interest in her employment created 
by State law and was therefore entitled to pre and post termination due process. 
She received neither. Due process also requires that the proceedings provided by 
the Board be meaningful and fair, and they were not. A violation of due process 
by a Utah governmental agency is an abuse of discretion, and also requires the 
Board's decision to be reversed and Howick to be reinstated with back pay and 
benefits. 
III. Howick is entitled to attorney fees under this Court's inherent power 
in the interest of justice and equity pursuant to the private attorney general 
doctrine and for acts by the City that were in bad faith, vexatious, wanton and for 
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oppressive reasons. She is also entitled to attorney fees under the due process 
provisions of the Utah Constitution Article 1, § 7. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING 
THAT HOWICK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS 
OF SECTION 10-3-1106 BASED ON HER ALLEGED AT-WILL 
STATUS. 
A. MISINTERPRETING THE LAW IS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
This Court reviews the Board's final action to determine if the Board 
"abused its discretion or exceeded its authority." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106(6)(c). The Board requested a legal opinion "about whether the conversion of 
Ms. Ho wick's position to an 'at-will' position was done appropriately." R. 96. 
Based on the legal opinion it received, the Board determined that "it did not have 
the authority to review the appeal of Ms. Ho wick" because Howick was an "at-
will" employee. Final Action, R. 73.3 
The Board thus found it had no jurisdiction by adopting a legal conclusion 
that the protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 did not apply to Howick. "In 
cases where the basic question is what does the law require? the standard is a 
correction of error standard." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 
28 (Ut. App. 1991) (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 
P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991). When "a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of 
While Mr. Buckley's letter states that the vote of the Board was unanimous, only 
three of the five Board members were present. See Final Action, R. 73; 
Attestation, R. 75. 
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discretion and thereby crossed the law, we review using a correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the tribunal's legal determination. We give no 
deference to such decisions because we are in as good a position as the tribunal to 
determine the law. Obviously the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is 
an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting the law." Id. at 
27.4 
B. THE BOARD MISINTERPRETED STATE LAW WHEN IT 
HELD THAT HO WICK'S POSITION WAS AT-WILL. 
Ho wick's position cannot be made at-will under the Utah Municipal Code, 
and thus she cannot be denied the protections of Section 10-3-1106. The Utah 
State Legislature has created protections for municipal employees and mandated 
restrictions on municipal employment actions under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106. 
Under those mandates, "fejxcept as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of 
a municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to 
discharge . . . only as provided in Section 10-3-1106." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1105(1) (emphasis added). Among the rights included in Section 10-3-1106, "[i]f 
an employee is discharged . . . the employee may . . . appeal the discharge . . . to a 
board to be known as the employee appeal board . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106(2)(a). 
4
 This Court noted that when it acts to correct a misinterpretation of law, it is 
finding an abuse of discretion by the tribunal. Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27. 
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Subsection 10-3-1105(2) states, "fsjubsection (1) [the grant of protected 
employment] does not apply to [the specifically listed employees in Subsections 
(2)(a) - (1)]." Utah Code Ann. § 1105(2) (emphasis added.) This statutory 
language is unequivocal. It expressly grants the protections of Section 10-3-1106 
to each employee of a municipality except when the employee is in a position 
enumerated in the list of exceptions in Section 10-3-1105(2). The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
When interpreting statutory law, our "primary goa l . . . is to give 
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." We also 
"assume that each term included in the [statute] was used advisedly." 
Moutv v. Sandy City, 2005 UT 41, If 17, 122 P.3d 521 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
Courts look to the plain language of a statute when interpreting statutory 
law. The plain language of Section 10-3-1105 does not exempt Howick's former 
position with Salt Lake City from statutory protections. The employees listed in 
Subsection (2) are: an officer of the City appointed by the mayor or by the 
comparable person or body in other forms of municipal government,5 a police or 
fire department employee, a police chief or deputy police chief, a fire chief or 
5
 The City does not contend that Howick was an officer of the City, and neither 
could she have been one. As defined in the Salt Lake City Code, the term 
"'officer' means and includes officers and boards in charge of departments and the 
members of such boards." Salt Lake City, Utah, Code § 1.04.010(C)(12). As one 
of numerous staff attorneys for the City, Howick was not in charge of the City 
Attorney's Office or any other department. 
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deputy or assistant fire chief, a department head or deputy department head, a 
superintendent, or a probationary, part-time or seasonal employee. Ho wick was 
employed as a staff attorney in the City Attorney's Office for 15 years under a job 
description used by many members of that Office. This position is not included 
within the list at Subsection (2). 
Courts also assume that each term in a statute is used advisedly. The 
language of Subsection 10-3-1105(2) is drafted precisely, and the Legislature used 
its terms advisedly. For example, when the Legislature amended this section in 
2004, it specifically added the term "assistant" to Subsection 1105(2)(f) in order to 
include an "assistant fire chief on the list of employees not subject to statutory 
protections. Minutes of the Senate Government Operations & Political 
Subdivisions Standing Committee (January 23, 2004) 
http://www.le.state.us/~2004/minutes/SGOP0123.pdf. See also Minutes of the 
House Political Subdivisions Standing Committee (January 30, 2004) 
http://www.le.state.us/-2004/minutes/HPOL0130.pdf (amendment introduced at 
urging of Utah League of Cities and Towns). The Legislature did not contemplate 
that other positions, such as this "assistant fire chief position, could be denied 
statutory protections unless they were expressly added to the list.6 
6
 Other governmental entities also recognize that a position may not be removed 
from a statutory merit employment system without Legislative authorization. For 
example, when the State of Utah wanted to remove certain information technology 
positions from the state merit system, it pursued an amendment to add Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-15(l)(t) in 2005. When Salt Lake County wanted to remove 
division directors who report to an elected official from its merit system at the 
13 
The Legislature's express list of exemptions at Section 10-3-1105 cannot be 
interpreted to include employment positions that the Legislature omitted. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "' statutory construction presumes that the 
expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.' Thus, we 
should give effect to any omission in the ordinance language by presuming that 
the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ^ 30, 104 
P.3d 1208 (quoting Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, U 14, 993 P.2d 
875). The Legislature placed specific and intentionally selected positions on its 
list at Subsection 10-3-1105(2), omitting all others, and Howick's position is not 
listed. 
Under the plain language of the statute, Howick's position falls under the 
broad mandate of Subsection (1) requiring that each employee of a municipality 
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge only as 
provided in Section 10-3-1106 and having a right to appeal a discharge. The 
Legislature has not exempted Howick's position from the statutory protections of 
Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and she is therefore entitled to them. 
urging of the Salt Lake District Attorney, the Legislature permitted that change, 
but grandfathered existing employees in those division director positions. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-1 (2008); S.B. 78, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2008). See also 
DA. makes case for - cronyism?\ S.L. Tribune, Feb. 10, 2008. No such changes 
have ever been made to the municipal merit system to permit a city to deny a 
municipal staff attorney position the protections of Section 10-3-1106. 
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C. SALT LAKE CITY CANNOT EXCEED ITS STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY AND VIOLATE THE UTAH MUNICIPAL 
CODE REGARDLESS OF THE MEANS IT USES, AND ITS 
ATTEMPTS TO DO SO ARE VOID. 
Through its ordinances, policies, procedures, and contracts, Salt Lake City 
has repeatedly attempted to give itself the power to create at-will positions and 
deny City employees statutory protections in violation of statute and in excess of 
the power granted by the Legislature under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106. 
However, regardless of the means it uses, the City cannot violate the mandates of 
the Legislature and exceed its statutory authority. "Whatever power or authority 
municipalities in this state have is derived from the Legislature." Salt Lake City v. 
Sutter, 216 P. 234, 237 (Utah 1923). "Local governments, as subdivisions of the 
State, exercise those powers granted to them by the State Legislature, [citing 
cases] and the exercise of a delegated power is subject to the limitations imposed 
by state statutes and state and federal constitutions." Harding v. Alpine City, 656 
P.2d 985, 986 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1980)). Since Salt Lake City, as a political subdivision of the State, is a creature 
of statute, its powers are limited to those found in statute. The City is thus bound 
by the mandates of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and it cannot make Howick an 
at-will employee in violation of law and in excess of the scope of its powers under 
those statutes. 
If the City attempts to circumvent the Legislature's directives, the City's 
acts are void. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal 
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no 
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those 
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly 
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared 
objects and purposes of the corporation . . . . Of every municipal 
corporation the charter or statute by which it is created is its organic 
act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act, or make 
any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized thereby, or by 
some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond the scope of 
the powers granted are void. 
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P. at 235 (emphasis omitted) quoting 1 Dillon on 
Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 237. While Utah courts no longer strictly 
construe a legislative grant of general welfare power to local governments, "local 
governments are without authority to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in 
conflict with, state statutory law." Hutchinson, 624 P.2d at 1121. 
Provisions of law that are illegal and void cannot be given any effect. This 
Court has stated that when it encounters such provisions, whether in the form of a 
regulation, rule or otherwise, or actions taken pursuant to them, this Court has "a 
duty to invalidate them." Draughon v. Dept. of Fin. Inst., 1999 UT App 42, \ 5, 
975 P.2d 935. (quoting Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 
1122 (Utah App. 1988). See also, Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46, 49 (Utah App. 
1989). 
7
 City actions cannot be "directly prohibited by, or . . . inconsistent with the policy 
of, the state or federal laws or the constitution of this State or of the United 
States." Id. at 1126. 
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1. Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory 
Authority By Ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-702 affirms that, "[t]he governing body may pass 
any ordinance to regulate, require, prohibit, govern, control or supervise any 
activity, business, conduct or condition authorized by this act or any other 
provision of law." (Emphasis added.) While municipalities may pass ordinances, 
they may only do so to the extent those ordinances are authorized by the Utah 
Municipal Code or other provisions of law. "It is well established that, where a 
city ordinance is in conflict with a state statute, the ordinance is invalid at its 
inception." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 15, 116 P.3d 290 (finding Salt Lake 
City ordinance invalid to the extent that it permitted what state law prohibited.) 
The Legislature's mandates at Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 are express 
limitations on the power that a city is authorized to exercise, and the City cannot 
exceed them. 
In its ordinances, Salt Lake City states that any employee has the right to 
appeal a discharge pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 except "a) those 
employees set forth in section 10-3-1105(2). . . and b) at-will employees. . . ." 
Salt Lake City Code § 2.52.130 (emphasis added). This ordinance provision 
purports to give the City power to create "at-will" positions exempt from statutory 
o 
Even when a city acts under a general welfare clause, specific grants of power 
"may serve to limit the means available under the general welfare clause, for some 
limitation may be imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use of power 
in a particular manner." Hutchinson, 624 P.2d at 1126. 
17 
protections in addition to those allowed by the Legislature in Subsection 10-3-
1105(2). This provision exceeds the Legislature's statutory grant of authority and 
violates Section 10-3-1105, and as such it is void. 
2. Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory 
Authority By Policies and Procedures. 
Salt Lake City has also adopted policies and procedures by which it 
attempts to give itself an expanded power to create at-will positions. However, 
just as a city cannot use an ordinance to violate the law or exceed the scope of its 
statutory authority, it likewise cannot do so by using a policy or procedure. 
An administrative agency's authority to promulgate regulations is 
limited to those regulations which are consonant with the statutory 
framework, and neither contrary to the statute nor beyond its scope. 
Administrative regulations may not conflict with the design of an 
Act, and when they do the court has a duty to invalidate them . . . 
Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a statute 
and issues a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess 
of administrative authority granted . . . Agency regulations may not 
abridge, enlarge, extend or modify [a] statute . . . . 
Draughon, 1999 UT App 42 at \ 5 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). See 
also Lorenc, 789 P.2d at 49 (a policy more restrictive than a rule promulgated 
under a statute abrogates the Legislature's objective, and u[w]hen such 
administrative regulations and policies 'conflict with the design of an Act,' we 
have a duty to invalidate them" (citation omitted)). 
These City policies and procedures also violate other sections of State law, 
including an express mandate that the Legislature imposes on cities to follow the 
requirements of the Legislature's merit employment plan. Utah Code Ann. § 10-
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3-1221 states, "[e]ach officer [of a city] shall have the power to prescribe rules and 
regulations, not inconsistent with general law, the municipal administrative code 
[the city's ordinances], and the merit plan" (emphasis added). Likewise, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, "[t]he governing body of each municipality shall 
prescribe rules and regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this 
state, as it deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, 
conduct, and business of the municipality." (Emphasis added.) 
Salt Lake City Policy 3.01.02 ("City Policies 3.01.01")attempts to define at-
will positions by stating, "[a]t-will positions are: A. Executive employees who 
report directly to the Mayor or a Department Director; B. Unclassified Employees; 
C. Part-time and seasonal employees; and, D. Regular employees who have not 
yet completed their probationary period." This policy makes no reference to 
Section 10-3-1105, and it designates employees without regard for that section's 
statutory requirements. To the extent it designates positions as at-will which are 
not listed in Section 10-3-1105(2), it is void. 
Further, in the Salt Lake City's Employee Appeal Board Procedures, the 
City states that its appeal process is available to "each employee of the City" 
except those in thirteen listed positions. Procedures I, E, Appendix 2.. For ease of 
comparison, the positions excepted by Section 10-3-1105(2) are set forth below 
next to the City's list. 
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City Procedures Section 10-34105(2) 
1. an officer appointed by the 
Mayor or the Mayor's 
designee; 
2. a mem ber of the police 
department or fire 
department who is a 
member of the classified 
civil service; 
3. a police chief; 
4. a deputy police chief; 
5. a fire chief; 
6. a deputy or assistant fire 
chief; 
7. a head of a City 
department; 
8. a deputy head of a City 
department; 
9. a superintendent; 
10. a probationary employee; 
11. an hourly part-time 
employee; 
12. seasonal employee; or 
13. any other at-will 
employee. 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or 
other person or body exercising 
executive power in the municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's 
police department or fire department 
who is a member of the classified 
civil service in a first or second 
class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the 
municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the 
municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal 
department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the 
municipality; 
(k) a part-time employee of the 
municipality; or 
(1) a seasonal employee of the 
municipality. 
The City's list follows the State statute with two exceptions. First, the City 
attempts to expand its powers under its first exception beyond the Legislature's 
mandate that exempted officers are those appointed by the mayor or the 
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comparable person or body in other forms of municipal government. Second, the 
City's thirteenth exception is not contained in the statute. Like City Policy 
3.01.02, this section of the Procedures attempts to give the City the ability to 
create at-will positions without regard for statutory requirements. Like City Policy 
3.01.02, it violates State statutory requirements under Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-
3-1106, and under Sections 10-3-1221 and 10-3-815, and to that extent it is void. 
3. Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory 
Authority By Contract. 
In addition to violating State requirements through ordinances, policies, and 
procedures, Salt Lake City also attempts to give itself an expanded power to 
designate at-will positions in violation of Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 by 
contract. However, all of Salt Lake City's contractual efforts to create at-will 
positions and deny statutory protections in violation of Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-
3-1106 are void. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that cities cannot exceed 
statutory restrictions on their powers by using contracts. "Neither the corporation 
nor its officers can do any act, or make any contract. . . not authorized [by the 
statutes creating the city]." Sutter.216 P. at 235 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a governmental entity's personnel 
policies constitute contracts, not legislative acts, and that a governmental entity 
lacks authority to promulgate such contracts in contravention of Utah statutory 
law. University of Utah v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51, H 26, 28 and 56, 144 P.3d 
1109 (finding that university personnel policies were contractual and could not 
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restrict firearms in contravention of statute). Further, public employees have the 
right to expect that their employers will create contracts that comply with the law. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d at 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995 (quoting 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992)) (employee 
wrongfully terminated since "[t]he County had an obligation to comply with the 
statutory provisions . . . in writing its manual and dealing with employees, and 
Thurston had the right to expect that the County would"). See also, Brummitt v. 
Ogden Waterworks Co., 93 P. 828 (Utah 1908) (portions of municipal contracts 
that exceed statutory powers are void, although other portions of the contract may 
be enforced). 
In this case, Salt Lake City has issued contracts in the form of policies, 
procedures, compensation plans, job descriptions and disclaimers all purporting to 
designate positions as at-will without regard to Section 10-3-1105(2). Under some 
of these documents, the City specifically designates Howick's position as being at-
will. The City also argues that Howick signed one such document in 1998 
agreeing that her position would thereafter be designated as at-will. As 
demonstrated above, the City cannot circumvent State law by contract because 
such contracts, whether issued as a general personnel policy or entered into with a 
specific person, exceed the City's authority and are void and unenforceable. 
The Preston opinion advised the Board that the City has the power to 
exceed statutory limitations on its powers through the use of contracts, but this 
argument is clearly in error. As Preston notes, a city may voluntarily undertake an 
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additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation to perform, but its acts 
cannot be "inconsistent with the underlying statute." Preston Opinion, R. 85. 
Additional contractual rights "[can] not alter or contradict an employee's statutory 
rights." Code v. Utah Dep't. of Health, 2007 UT App 390,1J6, 174 P.2d 1134 
(quoting Buckner v. Rennard, 2004 UT 78,1f 32, n.4, 99 P.3d 842). 
Preston also advised the Board that if municipal employee rights can be 
expanded by contract, it follows that Howick could waive statutory and 
constitutional employment protections. Preston Opinion, R. 86. Again, this 
argument is clearly in error. As Preston noted, this issue involves "whether the 
City could ask Ms. Howick to agree to waive those statutory rights." Preston 
Opinion, R. 85. The law clearly prohibits the City from exceeding its authority, 
and Howick cannot give to the City powers that the Legislature expressly withheld 
for the protection of city employees. Howick cannot give the City the power to 
circumvent a legislative policy. "Whatever power or authority municipalities in 
this state have is derived from the Legislature" Sutter, 216 P. at 237 (emphasis 
added). "Local governments . . . exercise those powers granted to them by the 
9
 See also Druffner v. Mrs. Fields, Inc., 828 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Utah App. 1992) 
(finding that a waiver and release agreement purporting to release claims arising 
from employment, including Fair Labor Standards Act claims, was unenforceable 
as a matter of law as against public policy; "contracts tending to encourage 
violation of laws are void as contrary to public policy . . . To permit an employer 
to secure a release from the worker . . . will tend to nullify the deterrent effect 
which Congress plainly intended that [FLSA] should have. Knowledge on the part 
of the employer that he cannot escape liability . . . by taking advantage of the 
needs of his employees tends to insure compliance in the first place." (Citations 
omitted)). See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231. 236 (Utah 1985) 
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State Legislature . . . ." Harding v. Alpine City, 656 P.2d at 986 (emphasis 
added). 
Salt Lake City cannot circumvent the limitations on its powers or violate 
the mandates of the Utah Municipal Code by asking for Ho wick's agreement. 
Where the Legislature gives the City no power to act, Howick cannot provide it. 
Instead, the City has "an obligation to comply with the statutory provisions" in its 
employment practices, and Howick has "the right to expect that the County [City] 
would." Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038. 
Salt Lake City cannot use any means to avoid or violate the mandates of 
Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 and other provisions of State code, and all of 
the City's efforts to do so are void. Irrespective of the manner of implementation, 
whenever the City exceeds its statutory authority or violates the law, its acts are 
void, and this Court has a duty to invalidate those provisions of City ordinances, 
policies, procedures, and contracts, and actions taken pursuant to them. 
(finding that where a household exclusion clause impacted minimum liability 
coverages mandated by state statute for operating a motor vehicle, it was "contrary 
to the public policy of this state and the statutory requirements found in the No-
Fault Insurance Act as to the minimum benefits provided by statute[,]" and the 
contract clause thus was invalid.); Code, 2007 UT App 390 at 1 6 ("[P]ublic 
employees' employment rights generally spring not from contract, but from 
legislative policy." (quoting Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 Utah App. 100, | 8, 
46 P.3d 247). 
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D. SALT LAKE CITY ACTED IN VIOLATION OF ITS OWN 
ORDINANCES REQUIRING IT TO COMPLY WITH STATE 
LAW. 
City ordinances mandate that the City comply with state employment laws, 
and they place an affirmative duty on the City to remedy any violations. Salt Lake 
City Code §§ 2.53.020 and 2.53.030(A) expressly mandate that the City must 
follow State requirements in City employment practices. Salt Lake City Code § 
2.53.020 provides that it covers employment practices and decisions relating to the 
City's "classified career and civil service systems," which it defines to mean 
"those job positions in Salt Lake City government lawfully included in the 
classified career and civil service system, as defined in title 10, chapter 3 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, the City ordinances and City policies enacted pursuant 
thereto." (Emphasis added.) The Code further states, "[e]mployment decisions 
and practices in Salt Lake City government's classified civil or career service 
systems that are contrary to state or federal law are prohibited." Salt Lake City 
Code § 2.53.030(A) (emphasis added). Thus, under the City's own ordinances, 
the City must comply with Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and City actions taken 
contrary to those statutes are prohibited. 
Further, if the City takes an unlawful employment action, City ordinances 
impose an affirmative duty on the City to correct unlawful practices. Under Salt 
Lake City Code § 2.53.060(A), "[i]f there has been a violation of this chapter, 
corrective, curative, or preventive action shall be taken to ensure that violations of 
this chapter, similar to those found, will not recur." (Emphasis added). Among 
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this section's requirements, the employee "shall be provided relief, which may 
include . . . 2. Cancellation of an unwarranted employment action; [and] 3. 
Restoration of the employee to the position the employee would have occupied 
absent the violation . . . ." Id at 2.53.060(B) (emphasis added). 
As demonstrated above, the City's efforts to make Howick's position at-will 
violated the Utah Municipal Code and exceeded its authority and are void, and the 
City's own ordinances require compliance with State law. The Board's decision, 
which was based entirely on Howick's allegedly at-will status, should therefore be 
reversed, and Howick should be reinstated with back pay and benefits. 
II. HOWICK HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND SHOULD BE 
REINSTATED. 
A. HOWICK HAS A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED 
EMPLOYMENT. 
This Court has "referred to public employment as a property right requiring 
due process upon discharge." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm'n, 949 
P.2d 746, 752 n.2 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't., 616 
P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980)).10 "[P]ublic employees have a property interest in 
continued employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued 
employment absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 752 
(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972). 
10
 "Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the 
due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm'n., 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942)). 
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This Court in Lucas found that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 created a property 
interest in continued employment for municipal police officers because it granted 
civil service employees security against discharge without cause and that section 
of State code "thus limits both the department head's and the Commission's 
discretion in making employment decisions." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 752-53. 
Like Section 10-3-1012, Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 guarantee continued 
employment for municipal employees by imposing limits on managerial 
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1) provides, "[e]xcept as provided in 
Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment without 
limitation of time, being subject to discharge . . . only as provided in Section 10-3-
1106." Section 10-3-1106 limits a municipal employer's discretion by providing 
that employees may not be discharged for the reasons stated in Subsection (1) or 
without sufficient cause pursuant to Subsection (3)(b). 
Additional limitations on municipal action are imposed under an appeal 
board's rules and standards of review as established by city ordinance pursuant to 
Section 10-3-1106(7). Under Salt Lake City Code ^ 2.24.060, the Board must 
determine whether an adverse action was warranted, meaning that the facts 
support a need for "discipline or other remedial action, " and if so, whether the 
action taken was proportionate to the charges. (Emphasis added.) 
As demonstrated in Section I of this Brief, Howick is entitled to the 
protections of Section 10-3-1106. She thus has a property interest - "a vested 
right to continued employment absent a legal cause for termination." Lucas, 949 
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P.2d at 753. However, the City terminated Howick's employment at-will, and the 
Board denied jurisdiction based on her alleged at-will status. The Board denied 
Howick due process that is constitutionally mandated to protect her property 
interest when it upheld the City's at-will termination of Howick's employment.11 
Howick is therefore entitled to reinstatement. 
B. THE CITY AND BOARD VIOLATED HOWICK'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHT TO FAIR PROCEDURES ADEQUATE TO 
PROTECT A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED 
EMPLOYMENT. 
This Court has found that "[i]f a property interest in continued employment 
exists, then the employee is entitled to procedures comporting with the minimum 
requirements of due process, as provided in the Constitution." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 
752. In considering "what process is due" to protect a property interest in 
continued employment, this Court has held that a deprivation must "'bepreceded 
by notice and opportunity for hearing' . . . [and this] is not a matter of legislative 
grace, but of'constitutional guarantee.'" Lucas, 949 P.2d at 753 (citing Mullane 
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57, 
(1950)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 
1492(1985). 
Specifically, this Court found that "before termination, minimum due 
process entitles an employee to oral or written notice of the charges, an 
11
 "It is a clear abuse of discretion for . . . [an administrative body] to exercise its 
discretion in such a way as to deny due process to a party appearing before it." 
Lucas, 949 P.2d at 754. 
28 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to 
present his or her side of the story in 'something less' than a full evidentiary 
hearing." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 753 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 545). When 
state statutes also provide for a full post-termination hearing, "the Loudermill 
Court also determined that due process . . . required a full, timely post-termination 
hearing." Id. The City and the Board failed to meet these procedural due process 
requirements in Howick's case, and the Board abused its discretion by, in effect, 
allowing her at-will termination to stand despite a lack of due process. 
1. Howick Received No Pretermination Process. 
The City insisted that Howick was an at-will employee and claimed that it 
did not have to have a reason for the decision to terminate her employment. The 
City thus gave her no notice of any charges against her and no explanation of a 
basis for any charges or opportunity to tell her side of any story, as mandated 
under Lucas and Loudermill. However, Howick was not an at-will employee, and 
the City violated Howick's right to due process before her termination. The 
Board's decision upheld this denial of due process. 
2. The City and Board Failed To Provide Post-Termination Due 
Process. 
The City and its Board also failed to provide constitutionally mandated 
post-termination hearing procedures. Pretermination procedures must be "coupled 
with a full post-termination hearing cat a meaningful time.'" Lucas, 949 P.2d at 
754, (citing Loudermill 470 U.S. at 546-47). 
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Initially, the Board's staff denied Howick access to any post-termination 
process based on a decision by the City Labor Relations Officer, who coordinates 
and provides staff support to the Board under the Procedures. On appeal, this 
Court pointed out that Howick had a right to obtain a determination from the 
Board regarding its own jurisdiction and that the Labor Relations Officer had 
interfered with that right.12 
After this Court pointed out the City's violation of Howick's rights, her 
Notice of Appeal was given to the Board. However, the procedure employed by 
the Board again circumvented any meaningful review. Essentially, the City asked 
its Board to return the matter to this Court, and the Board did so. Thus, the Board 
failed to provide constitutionally-mandated post termination due process. 
3. The City and Board Failed to Provide a Meaningful and Fair 
Proceeding in Violation of Due Process Requirements. 
The Board also abused its discretion and denied Howick due process by 
failing to provide her with any meaningful review. "It is a clear abuse of 
12
 "Salt Lake City's Employee Appeals Board procedures nowhere permit the 
City's Labor Relations Officer to issue final decisions regarding the Board's 
jurisdiction. Rather, those procedures allow the Board to request an opinion from 
the City Attorney regarding questions of whether an employee is within the class 
of persons who may appeal. See Salt Lake City Employee Board Procedures, 
III(G), Appendix 2. Salt Lake City's method of dealing with Howick's notice of 
appeal circumvents judicial review of the decision regarding the Board's 
jurisdiction by substituting a letter from the Labor Relations Officer for a final 
administrative decision of the Board." Howick, 2008 UT App 216. See also 
Watson v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center, 75 F.3d 569, 580-81 (10th Cir. Utah 
1996) (If an employer "agreed to follow a specific avenue to resolve the status of 
plaintiffs employment, and then actively interfered with that process, they 
violated plaintiffs right to procedural due process . . .") 
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discretion for an administrative body to exercise its discretion over the manner in 
which it conducts its proceedings such that it denies due process to a party 
appearing before it." Tolman, 818 P.2d at 28. 
This Court has stated that an employee can rely "upon any procedural 
protections afforded by contract, ordinance, or state statute." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 
752. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "every person who brings a claim in 
a court or at a hearing held before an administrative agency has a due process right 
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal." Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 740P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987) (citing Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 
696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985). 
Due process requires certain safeguards. "At a minimum, timely and 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very 
heart of procedural fairness." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876 (citations omitted). 
"[TJhese protections are, indeed, fundamental rights which inure to the benefit of 
every citizen of this state." Id. at 877. Furthermore, "[fjairness requires not only 
an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of 
unfairness." Bunnell 740 P.2d at 1333 (emphasis added, quotation omitted). 
Further, due process requires that an administrative body consider the legal 
contentions of the party appearing before it. This Court has stated "an agency 
must at some point address the legal issues raised by a party appearing before it." 
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31 (citing Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Central Weber Sewer 
Improv. Dist, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1955)). A determination must be prepared 
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"in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the 
ultimate conclusions." Id, at 32 n.8. The failure to address "legal contentions [is] 
. . . an abuse of discretion . . ." Id. at 32. Additionally, "the making of a clearly 
erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or 
misinterpreting the law." Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
The Board's handling of Ho wick's appeal did not provide to Howick a fair 
and meaningful proceeding before a fair tribunal. The Board met twice for a 
combined total of 21 minutes. R. 8-25; R. Exhibit A. It permitted Howick no 
participation in the proceeding other than the right to submit "written 
documentation" to its first meeting, although the City's representative was present 
during at least one Board meeting.13 R. 104. Howick submitted her legal 
contentions to the Board. R. 47-68. Without addressing Howick's legal 
contentions, the City argued that the Board should simply accept the City's 
unlawful classification and allow this Court to consider Howick's contentions on 
appeal. R. 27-46. 
In response, the Board requested a legal opinion from the City Attorney, 
who recused himself and selected Preston to provide the requested legal opinion. 
R. 94-95. Preston opined that the City's actions were legal without ever 
addressing Howick's contentions regarding the City's authority and the 
requirements of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106. R. 82-87. Three of the five Board 
1 O 
The City's Director of Human Resources, who has no role in the Board process, 
attended at least the Board's first meeting. R. 100. 
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members then met and adopted Preston's opinion in the Board's second meeting, 
which lasted approximately two minutes. The Board adopted the opinion through 
a verbal vote instead of a secret ballot as required by Section 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i). 
R. Exhibit A at 3. Preston's opinion was in error, but Howick never even saw the 
Preston opinion until the City produced the record to her three weeks after the 
Board rendered its decision. Appendix 5. 
These proceedings did not provide Howick any "opportunity to be heard in 
a meaningful way." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876. The Board never considered 
Howick's legal contentions as it must. See Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31. The Board's 
determination does not "demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the 
ultimate conclusions." Id. at 32 n.8. By failing to provide a fair and meaningful 
proceeding to Howick, the Board abused its discretion. 
The City has twice demonstrated that it will not provide due process to 
Howick. However, in this case, the Court's decision about the legality of treating 
Howick as an at-will employee will resolve all issues before the Board. For that 
reason, the Board's decision regarding Howick's status as an at-will employee 
should be overturned, and Howick reinstated to her position. 
III. HOWICK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
Howick is entitled to the protections of Section 10-3-1106, and the actions 
of the City, its Board and Board staff exceeded and violated the Utah Municipal 
Code and Howick's constitutional rights to due process. Therefore, this Court 
should award Howick attorney fees pursuant to the legal doctrines set forth below. 
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A. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO 
HO WICK UNDER ITS INHERENT POWER IN THE 
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY BASED ON THE 
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE. 
Under their inherent power to award attorney fees in the interest of justice 
and equity, "[cjourts have also awarded attorney fees to a party as a private 
attorney general when the vindication of a strong or societally important public 
policy takes place and the necessary costs in doing so transcend the individual 
plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization." Stewart, 885 
P.2d at 783 (quotations omitted).14 This Court has stated that under this doctrine it 
determines whether a legal action "vindicated fa strong or societally important 
public policy;' whether 'the necessary costs in doing so transcend[ed] [Plaintiffs'] 
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization;' and whether this case is 
exceptional such that an award of fees is appropriate under the private attorney 
general doctrine." Culbertson, 2008 UT App. 22, at If 10 (quoting Utahns for 
Better Dental Health-Davis Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97, f 5, 175 P.3d 
1036). 
Under the first of these factors, vindication of a strong or societally 
important public policy, this Court has found that the requirement is met when an 
action is brought not only to protect a party's property, "but also to require 
14
 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that when an issue is presented to an 
appellate court, "an issue need not [first] be presented to an administrative agency 
if it cannot properly decide the issue." Stewart, 885 P.2d at 781. The Board 
cannot award attorney's fees or costs. Procedures I, C, Appendix 2. 
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[government] . . . to abide by its own ordinances . . . Such motivation serves the 
important public policy of 'ensuring] that [government is] . . . governed by the 
rule of law, not of man.'" Culbertson, 2008 UT App 22 at ^ 12 (quoting Fox v. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)). This Court 
noted that, as in this case, a private action can serve to curb government's "willful 
disregard of its own ordinances and procedures[,]" and to prevent government 
officials from "willfully disregarding . . . ordinances to obtain their own economic 
advantage." Id. at ^ 13 and 14. This is particularly important where a party has 
sought "to resolve this issue without litigation, yet their efforts were rebuffed." Id. 
at ^ 15. A private legal action benefits "a large number of citizens" when it forces 
government "to abide by the rule of law when no other avenue toward that end had 
been successful." Id. at f^ 15 
Ho wick's action serves such a purpose, and vindicates an important public 
policy. It demonstrates that cities cannot disregard legislative limitations on their 
powers and violate the law. "All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are 
void." ). "[T]he exercise of a [City's] delegated power is subject to the 
limitations imposed by state statutes and state and federal constitutions." Harding 
v. Alpine City, 656 P.2d at 986. Further, the court has "a duty to invalidate" acts 
that exceed a city's powers. Lorenc, 789 P.2d at 49. 
Howick's case also vindicates important public policies regarding 
employment. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an employee's property 
right to work and receive compensation for work is "one of the most important of 
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the liberties vouched safe to one in our society. It was so regarded by the framers 
of our state constitution. Article XII, § 19." Backman v. Bateman, 263 P.2d 561, 
563 (Utah 1953). The court declared that these rights "are of paramount 
importance and that they should be safeguarded to the highest possible degree 
consistent with the public good." Id. Further, cities have an "obligation to comply 
with the statutory provisions . . . [in their policies and in] dealing with employees," 
and employees have the "right to expect" that they will. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 
1038. 
Further, Howick's action vindicates important public policies requiring that 
the City provide due process. Consistent with the first factor in Culbertson, 
Howick sought to discuss the illegal nature of the City's termination action with 
the City Attorney several times but was rebuffed in her efforts. She then sought to 
use the City's administrative process to address this matter, but the Board's staff 
refused to provide Howick access to that process despite the clear requirements of 
the Board's own Procedures. See Procedures III, G, Appendix 2. After this Court 
pointed out this clear violation,15 Howick's Notice of Appeal was given to the 
Board. However, Howick's participation in the appeal was limited to submitting 
written documentation of her position. The Board sought and obtained a legal 
opinion, which failed to address Howick's legal contentions. Nevertheless, three 
Board members met and adopted that opinion in a meeting lasting approximately 
15
 See. Howick, 2008 UT App 216. 
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two minutes. As demonstrated in Section II above, the City denied Howick due 
process at every step, both before and after the termination of her employment. 
Under the second factor of Culbertson, the court examines whether the 
necessary costs in pursuing this matter transcend Howick's pecuniary interest to 
an extent requiring subsidization. This matter has created severe hardships for 
Howick, yet this kind of harm is very difficult and expensive to remedy. An 
employee must bring a challenge to vindicate these rights at a time when the 
employee, who is without a job and therefore without an income, is least able to 
pursue it. Raising a challenge creates severe stress and difficulty for the employee 
and places at risk the employee's ability to return to the workplace or find other 
employment. Meanwhile, the City is free to continue to insist on illegal action 
without suffering similar impacts, and with adequate funding to draw out the 
process and escalate its difficulties. 
Further, Howick's position is one of numerous City positions that are 
subject to an illegal at-will designation, and thus Howick's action will benefit 
similarly situated employees and act as a deterrent to future illegal City actions. 
The City's Unclassified Compensation Plan, which has now been combined with 
the City's Executive Compensation Plan, was created to cover these illegally 
classified positions, and these plans were drafted without regard for the statutory 
provisions of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.16 Meanwhile, employees seeking to 
16
 The City combined its Unclassified Compensation Plan and Executive 
Compensation Plan in July of 2008. See supra note 2 at 5 and Appendix 3. The 
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vindicate these important rights face strong financial and personal disincentives, 
and the City's classifications, ordinances, policies, procedures, and contracts have 
previously gone without challenge.17 This action will make it less likely that 
municipal employees, including others at the City, will be subjected to illegal 
classifications by their employers or be subjected to deliberately protracted and 
improper processes if they seek to vindicate their rights. 
Under the third factor in Culbertson, this case is extraordinary. Howick 
sought to address obvious problems with the City's action without bringing any 
legal action at all, but the City refused even to respond. Howick then sought to 
resolve this matter through the legislatively-mandated administrative process, 
which requires an appeal board to render a decision within fifteen days. In 
new Executive Compensation Plan claims to apply to "Elected Officials and those 
full-time City employees classified as 'Appointed' employees," which it defines to 
be "'at-will' employees serving at the pleasure of the Mayor . . ." Executive 
Compensation Plan, Section II, Appendix 3. The plan lists all of these positions in 
Appendix A under Levels 001-017 and 097-099. That list not only appears to 
contain numerous positions that do not comply with the requirements of Sections 
10-3-1105 and 1106, it contains five levels which state "Appointments Pending" 
rather than designating existing positions. It thus appears that the City has 
retained and intends to include even more illegally classified positions in its newly 
revised plan despite the fact that when the City adopted this compensation plan in 
July 2008, Howick had been pointing out the illegal nature of the City's 
classifications for nearly a year. 
17
 The City's newly combined Executive Compensation Plan makes it even less 
feasible for an employee to challenge the City's illegal classifications. In Section 
XVI of the plan, the City provides for severance pay for "appointed employees" 
who are terminated without cause, but only if they "execute a release of all claims 
approved by the City Attorney's Office." Executive Compensation Plan, 
Appendix 3. Employees thus must choose between challenging an illegal 
classification, or receiving severance income after losing their jobs. 
38 
response, the City willfully disregarded its own requirements and State law by 
denying Ho wick access to the Board. Once this Court pointed out the City's 
violation, the City then provided for a meaningless process designed to return the 
matter to this Court. 
The Legislature mandates a speedy and cost-effective process for 
determining these disputes affecting the property rights and income of municipal 
employees, but the City's deliberate actions have instead forced Ho wick to incur 
many tens of thousands of dollars in expense and to spend over a year pursuing a 
vindication of her rights. The City made a deliberate choice to engage in 
protracted litigation in an effort to waste Howick's resources and coerce her 
acceptance of the City's wrongful actions, and these choices were made by the 
City Attorney and management personnel at the highest levels. The City was 
unwilling "to respond in a meaningful way to [Howick's] prelitigation claims and 
its engagement in this protracted litigation distinguishes this case from the run of 
the mill dispute between a public entity and members of the public." Culbertson, 
2008 UT App at If 18. Howick thus has met this Court's three factors, and is 
entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.18 
Howick is prepared to submit to this Court an affidavit of attorney fees and 
costs incurred in connection with seeking review of the decision to terminate her 
employment and vindication of statutory and constitutional rights. When this 
Court has original jurisdiction of a matter, it has referred factual issues to the 
District Court for appropriate proceedings. See Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 
808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). 
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B. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO 
HOWICK UNDER ITS INHERENT POWER IN THE 
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY BASED ON ACTS BY 
THE CITY IN BAD FAITH, VEXATIOUSLY, WANTONLY 
OR FOR OPPRESSIVE REASONS. 
Under this Court's equitable powers, it may also award attorney fees when 
a party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 (citing James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
P 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)). Stewart does not define bad faith, but cases in other 
contexts offer guidance. In defining bad faith in a statutory context, the court held 
that these terms imply action that is willful or dishonest, involves "some motive of 
self-interest," or involves a "deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a 
belief or fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect — that is to say, where 
there is an intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the ears." Research 
Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
In defining bad faith in the analogous context of awarding attorneys fees 
under Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-825, the Utah Supreme Court has defined good faith 
as "(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent 
to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of 
the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others." Still 
Standing Stable, LLC, v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, f 12, 122 P.3d 556 (quoting In Re: 
Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 Utah 3, ]f 48, 86 P.3d 712. When any one of 
these factors is lacking a party has acted in bad faith. Id. 
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The facts of this case demonstrate conduct that it is in bad faith, vexatious, 
wanton and for oppressive reasons. The City's actions show a "deliberate desire 
to evade knowledge" and to "close its eyes" as the City Attorney and the City 
Labor Relations Officer repeatedly rebuffed Howick's requests to examine the 
law. See Research Planning, Inc., 690 P.2d at 1132. The City could not have had 
"an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question" when, among other 
things, the City Attorney refused to examine the law, the original Labor Relations 
Officer obtained Howick's job description rather than following the Board's own 
Procedures, and the acting Labor Relations Officer also refused to follow the 
Board's Procedures and circumvented the jurisdiction of this Court. See Still 
Standing Stable, LLC, 2005 UT 46 at If 12. 
These actions further demonstrate an intent to "take unconscionable 
advantage of others[,]" and that the City had a knowledge and intent of activities 
that would "hinder, delay or defraud others." Id. at ^ 12. Both State statute and 
City procedures require an expedited process of fifteen days when an employee 
appeals to the Board.19 Yet the City refused to comply with the law, and through 
its deliberate efforts to create delay, it greatly increased the time and expense 
necessary for Howick to obtain a review and decision. 
The City took these actions despite the fact that the courts have recognized 
the significance of determining public employment rights. The Utah Supreme 
19
 See Section 10-3-1106(3)(a), (3)(b)(i) and (ii), and (5)(a)(i) and (ii). See also 
Procedures III, F; III G; and IV, A, Appendix 2. 
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Court noted that employment property rights "are of paramount importance and 
that they should be safeguarded to the highest possible degree consistent with the 
public good." Backman, 263 P.2d at 563. 
The City also acted despite the fact that the courts have recognized the 
hardships associated with improper employment actions. Terminated employees 
are in a "particularly vulnerable position." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 
840 (Utah 1992). The employee may be subjected to a "lengthy wait for 
vindication, and to the attendant and often traumatic disruptions to his personal 
and economic life." Loudermill 470 U.S. at 549 (J. Marshall concurrence). 
"During this period the employee is left in limbo[.]" Id, It is "in no respect 
certain" that even a prompt post-deprivation hearing will make him or her whole -
"the wrongfully discharged employee will almost inevitably suffer irreparable 
injury." Id at 550. "Of perhaps equal concern, the personal trauma experienced 
during the long months in which the employee awaits decision, during which he 
suffers doubt, humiliation, and the loss of an opportunity to perform work, will 
never be recompensed, and indeed probably could not be with dollars alone." Id 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the effects of an arbitrary 
termination are "far-reaching and drastic" on the lives of "capable and faithful 
public employees who have given many years to a particular job." Backman, 263 
P.2d at 564. 
The City's actions in this case are egregious, and they constitute conduct 
that is in bad faith, vexatious, wanton or for oppressive reasons. These actions 
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have imposed severe hardship and expense on Howick, and have created the very 
hazards that Utah courts and the United States Supreme Court have spoken against 
so strongly. The City pursued this course despite the fiduciary nature of its 
obligations to comply with the law and properly administer employment rights, 
including through the City's Board process. Therefore, the City's actions meet the 
test stated in Stewart, and this Court should exercise its inherent equitable power 
and award attorney fees to Howick. 
C. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO 
HOWICK UNDER THE DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution also provides for the 
award of attorney fees in this appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has found that the 
Due Process Clause of Article I, § 7 is self-executing, and that "self-executing 
constitutional provisions allow for awards of money damages." Spackman, 2000 
UT 87 at ^ 19 (quotations ommitted). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
"judicial tradition gives [a court] the authority to do this under appropriate 
circumstances." Id. at 1f 21. See also Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, f 22, 184 
P.3d 592 (stating that in Spackman the Supreme Court "noted that the common 
law gives the judiciary authority to provide civil remedies for constitutional 
violations under appropriate circumstances.") 
The court in Spackman stated that in a tort suit for damages three elements 
must be established, and those elements may be applied here. "First, a plaintiff 
must establish that he or she suffered a 'flagrant' violation of his or her 
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constitutional rights." Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at f^ 23. As discussed in Section II 
of this Brief, Ho wick suffered a flagrant violation of her constitutional rights to 
receive due process of law under the U.S. Constitution and under Article I, § 7 of 
the Utah Constitution. The City's actions twice deliberately denied due process to 
Howick despite the requirements of Section 10-3-1106 and the City's own 
Procedures mandating a fast and cost-effective process. As a result, Howick was 
instead forced to pursue an expensive and lengthy process to obtain a fair review. 
This Court has stated that the City's actions were not permitted by its own 
Procedures and that they circumvented judicial review. Howick, 2008 UT App 
216. 
The Spackman court stated that "[s]econd, a plaintiff must establish that 
existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries." Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at ^  
24. This appeal is not a suit for damages. The remedy available in this appeal is 
reinstatement, but Howick has incurred many tens of thousands of dollars in legal 
fees and expenses due to the City's illegal actions. The existing remedy does not 
redress Howick's injuries; if she is reinstated, she will have to spend a substantial 
portion of her annual government salary to pay expenses that the City illegally 
forced her to incur. The harm is not remedied in this case if Howick retains her 
job, but at a cost she can ill afford. 
Finally, the Spackman court stated that "[t]hird, a plaintiff must establish 
that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect 
the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her injuries." Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at 
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f 25. As discussed in the foregoing paragraph, restoring Howick's job does not 
make her whole if she must incur the cost of correcting the City's deliberate and 
illegal conduct. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the constitutional rights that 
individuals hold in their employment under the Utah Constitution include "[t]he 
right to work, the right to engage in gainful occupations, [and] the right to receive 
compensation for one's work..." Backman, 263 P.2d at 562-63 (emphasis 
added). Non-monetary equitable relief alone will be wholly inadequate to protect 
Howick's constitutional rights in her employment under the Utah Constitution, 
including her right to receive compensation for her work. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not limited an award of damages for a 
violation of Utah's constitutional due process requirements to cases arising in a 
particular forum. The Court stated that these damages may be awarded in 
"appropriate circumstances" at a court's discretion. Under this flexible standard, 
damages may be applied to a matter arising before an appeal board that must be 
appealed to this Court due to a flagrant denial of due process. Howick's 
circumstances meet the test established by the Utah Supreme Court to obtain an 
award of attorney fees as damages under the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
Constitution, and this Court should award her attorney fees on that basis. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Howick was wrongfully terminated from her position as an attorney for Salt 
Lake City solely on the basis of her allegedly at-will status in excess of the City's 
statutory authority and in violation of the Utah Municipal code. Howick was also 
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denied constitutionally mandated due process to protect her property interest in her 
employment both before and after the termination of that employment, and by the 
manner in which the City, its Board and staff conducted the proceedings. Howick 
therefore requests that this Court: 
1. Reverse the decision of the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board 
and reinstate her to her position in the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office because 
she was a City employee entitled to the protections of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-
1105 and 1106, and because her due process rights have been violated by the City 
and the Board; and 
2. Award her attorneys fees and costs incurred in connection with 
seeking review of the decision to terminate her employment and vindication of 
statutory and constitutional rights on the bases set forth in Section III above. 
Dated this 3 ^ day of October, 2008. 
AcArCVe!?^ 
Ehzabejh T. Dunning 
Attorney for Petitioner Jodi Ho\ 
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3. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _^J )day of October, 2008, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners Brief was hand delivered to: 
W. Mark Gavre 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation 
MJ.L C ~ " ^ ^ f l ^ ' ^ ^ ^ 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL 15, 
2007 (FEDERAL CASES). *** 
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
PART 11. PERSONNEL RULES AND BENEFITS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2007) 
§ 10-3-1105. Municipal employees - Duration and termination of employment - Exceptions 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment without limitation of 
time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less 
remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member of the classified civil service 
in a first or second class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a municipality's ability to define cause for an 
employee termination or reduction in force. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,10-3-1105, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 3; 2004, ch. 260, § 1. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION, *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL 15, 
2007 (FEDERAL CASES). *** 
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
PART 11. PERSONNEL RULES AND BENEFITS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007) 
§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer - Appeals - Board - Procedure 
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or involuntarily 
transferred to a position with less remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments. 
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily transferred from 
one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the 
discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, established under 
Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's rights 
under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board. 
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder 
within ten days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final disposition 
of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or involuntary 
transfer. 
(b) (i) Upon the riling of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the 
appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its 
investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge, 
suspension, or transfer. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder within 15 days 
from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5X&X9 to a maximum of 60 days, if 
the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is dischaiBed or suspended without pay; 
or 
(ii) any deficiency in saiaiy for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of less 
remuneration. 
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a 
notice of appeal. 
(b) Each notice of appeal under Subsection (6Xa) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or 
order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the puipose of determining if the 
appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal boaxxi, the number of members, the designation 
of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the 
governing body of each municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under Part 12, Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7Xa) may provide that the governing body of 
the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,10-3-1106, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 3; 2004, ch. 260, § 2. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-702 (2007) 
§ 10-3-702. Extent of power exercised by ordinance 
The, governing body may pass any ordinance toiegulate, require, prohibit, govern, control or supervise any activity, 
business, conduct or condition authorized by this act or any other provision of law. An officer of the municipality shall not be 
convicted of a criminal offense where he relied on or enforced an ordinance he reasonably believed to be a valid ordinance. It 
shall be a defense to any acdon for punitive damages that the official acted in good faith in enforcing an ordinance or that he 
enforced an ordinance on advice of legal counsel. 
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§ 10-3-815. Rules and regulations for administration of municipality 
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this state, as it deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct and business of the municipality. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1221 (2007) 
§ 10-3-1221. Municipal administrative code in council-mayor form 
It shall also be the duty of the first mayor elected under the provisions of this part to draft and submit to the council, within 
six months after assuming office, a proposed ordinance providing for the division of the administrative service of the 
municipality into departments, divisions, and bureaus, and defining the functions and duties of each. Subsequent to the 
adoption of this ordinance, upon recommendation of the mayor, the council by ordinance may create, consolidate, or abolish 
departments, divisions, and bureaus and define or alter the functions and duties of each. The compilation of the ordinances 
shall be known as the "municipal administrative code." Each officer shall have the power to prescribe rules and regulations, 
not inconsistent with general law, the municipal administrative code, and the merit plan. Prior to the adoption of the 
municipal administrative code, the mayor shall have power to establish temporary rules and regulations to ensure efficiency 
and effectiveness in the divisions of the municipal government. 
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2.52.130 Discharge, Suspension Or Transfer: 
In all cases where any employee, except: a) those employees set forth in section 10-3-1105 
(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or its successor, and b) at-will employees, is discharged, 
suspended for more than two (2) days without pay (2 shifts for employees who work shifts 
longer than 8 hours), or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less 
remuneration, the employee shall have the right to appeal such action in accordance with 
sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or its successor. (Ord. 62-05 
§ 2, 2005: prior code § 25-11-3) 
2.53.020 Covered Employees And Applicants: 
This chapter covers employment practices and decisions relating to Salt Lake City 
government's classified career and civil service systems. "Classified career and civil service 
systems" means those job positions in Salt Lake City government lawfully included in the 
classified career and civil service, as defined in title 10, chapter 3 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
the city ordinances and city policies enacted pursuant thereto. (Ord. 87-98 § 1, 1998) 
2.53.030 Prohibited Employment Decisions And Practices: 
A. Employment decisions and practices in Salt Lake City government's classified civil or career 
service systems that are contrary to state or federal law are prohibited. 
B. Employment decisions and practices in Salt Lake City's classified career service and civil 
service system shall be based on job related criteria. 
1. The term "job related criteria" as used in this chapter means those criteria necessary or 
desirable to perform successfully the job held or sought. The term includes the personal 
and professional attributes, qualifications, experience, character, interpersonal skills, 
education and training, and those qualifications and skills identified in a written job 
description. 
2. The following are not "job related criteria" and shall not be used as a basis for an 
employment decision or disciplinary action: a) the status of having a lifestyle which is 
irrelevant to successful job performance; and b) the status of being in or outside of an adult 
interpersonal relationship or a family relationship. 
3. Nothing in this section shall prevent the city from taking disciplinary action with respect to 
classified career service or civil service employees where there exists a reasonable nexus 
between an act or failure to act that: a) adversely affects job performance; b) disrupts the 
workplace; c) undermines the authority of management; d) impairs close working 
relationships essential to the efficiency of the workplace; or e) otherwise impedes a safe, 
efficient or effective work environment. (Ord. 87-98 § 1, 1998) 
2.53.060 Remedies And Relief: 
A. If there has been a violation of this chapter, corrective, curative, or preventive action shall 
be taken to ensure that violations of this chapter, similar to those found, will not recur. 
B. If an applicant for a position or an employee in the Salt Lake City government's classified 
career and civil service systems has been the subject of an employment decision or 
practice done in violation of this chapter, the applicant or employee shall be provided relief, 
which may include the following: 
1. The applicant may be offered the position the applicant would have occupied absent the 
violation or, if justified by the circumstances, a substantially equivalent position, unless the 
evidence indicates that the applicant would not have been selected even absent the 
violation; 
2. Cancellation of an unwarranted employment action; 
3. Restoration of the employee to the position the employee would have occupied absent 
the violation; and 
4. Adverse matters relating to an employment decision or practice in violation of this 
chapter shall be expunged from the applicant's or employee's personnel records. (Ord. 87-
98 §1,1998) 
1, General 
1.1 Regular full-time employees are eligible for the City's benefits package, subject to the terms, conditions, and 
limitations of each benefit program and specific employee elections. 
1.2 Regular part-time employees are eligible for some benefits sponsored by Salt Lake City, subject to the terms, 
conditions, and limitations of each benefit program and specific employee elections. 
1.3 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are selected through an open competitive process. 
1.4 Part-time and seasonal employees and interns are only entitled to benefits required by federal, state, or 
municipal law. 
1.5 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are subject to a probationary period to determine if further 
employment with the City is appropriate. The duration of the probationary period is designated when vacancies are 
filled. 
1.6 At their discretion, supervisors may extend probationary periods due to job cycle requirements or performance 
problems or goals. Such extensions shall not exceed 60 days, and must be made in writing not later than 30 days 
prior to the conclusion of the original probationary period. This provision does not apply to Civil Service 
employees. 
1.7 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are entitled to bidding rights as specified in memoranda of 
understanding or Division of Human Resources procedures approved by the Attorney's Office. 
1.8 At will positions are: 
A. Executive employees who report directly to the Mayor or a Department Director; 
B. Unclassified Employees; 
C. Part-time and seasonal employees; and, 
D. Regular employees who have not yet completed their probationary period. 
1.9 Definitions: 
A. Regular full-time: Employees whose positions regularly require 40 hours per week on a full-time 
schedule. 
B. Regular part-time: Employees whose positions regularly require 20 hours or more but less than 40 
hours per week. 
C. Part-time or hourly: Employees whose positions require less than 20 hours per week. 
D. Seasonal: Employees who work during a specific season equal to or less than eleven months in 
duration defined by the department. 
E. Intern: Students working for the City through a recognized university or college for a specified period 
of time, as defined by the department. 
F. Exempt/Non-exempt: Employees "exempt" or "non-exempt" from the payment of overtime in 
accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
G. Probationary period: The period of time that an employee serves as part of the hiring process before 
career service or civil service status is granted to the employee. For career service employees this period is 
180 days. For civil service employees, the length of probationary periods is determined by the Civil 
Service Commission, 
H. Telecommuting: A work arrangement in which the workplace is located, at least part of the time, at 
an alternative location such as an employee's residence. 
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PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
f Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
*ee government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
ION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Bction 
L. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
J. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
t. [Religious liberty] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
>. [Right to bear arms.] 
r
. [Due process of law.] 
L [Offenses bailable.] 
I. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
I. [Trial by jury.] 
. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
I. [Rights of accused persons.] 
i. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impair ing contracts.] 
. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
. [Slavery forbidden.] 
. [Private property for public use.] 
. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
. [Rights retained by people.] 
[Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
Section 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the r ights of crime victims.] 
29. [Marriage.] 
Sec t ion 1. [Inherent a n d inal ienable r ights . ] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable r ight to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of thei r con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of tha t 
right. 1896 
Sec . 2. [All pol i t ical p o w e r inherent in t h e people . ] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the r ight to al ter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec . 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union . ] 
The State of U tah is an inseparable par t of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec . 4. [Rel ig ious liberty.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rus t or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. 1999 
Sec . 5. [Habeas corpus. ] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec . 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual r ight of the people to keep and bear a rms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; bu t nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec . 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec . 8. [Offenses bai lable . ] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substant ial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substant ial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by s ta tu te as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substant ia l evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence t h a t the person 
would consti tute a substantial danger to any other person 
1343 
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or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law, 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excess ive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of tr ial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the ju ry shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by s tatute , but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer t han four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec . 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tr ibunal in 
this Sta te , by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec . 12. [Rights of accused persons . ] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
na tu re and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the a t tendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impart ia l ju ry of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment , be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by s ta tute . Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by s ta tute 
or rule in whole or in par t a t any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or a t any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by s ta tu te or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecut ion by in format ion or ind ic tment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate , unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or withcSTsueli examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the "grand ju ry and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable s e a r c h e s forbidden — Issu-
a n c e of warrant . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
>f shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upoi 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
d describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing t( 
.) be seized. i8& 
L
" Sec . 15. [Freedom of s p e e c h and of the pres s — Libel. 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom o 
^ speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
® t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shai 
appear to the jury tha t the mat ter charged as libelous is true 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends 
the par ty shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the righi 
a to determine the law and the fact. 189< 
g 
£ Sec . 16. [No impri sonment for debt — Except ion. ] 
e There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases oi 
f. absconding debtors. ism 
Sec. 17. [Elect ions to be free — Soldiers vot ing. ] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military 
shall a t any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of th€ 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at theii 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
B prescribed by law. 1896 
I Sec . 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto l a w s — Impairing 
* contracts . ] 
i No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
3 obligation of contracts shall be passed. 189€ 
Sec. 19. [Treason denned — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying wai 
3 against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
3 and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
/ the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
1 Sec . 20. [Military subordinate to the civi l power.] 
t The mili tary shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
c power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in t ime of war 
T except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec . 21 . [S lavery forbidden.] 
" Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the par ty shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec . 22. [Private property for publ ic use . ] 
r
 Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
>
 use without ju s t compensation. 1896 
Sec . 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
J No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
> privilege or immunity. 1896 
L 
i Sec . 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws. ] 
\ All laws of a general na ture shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
Sec . 25. [Rights re ta ined by people . ] 
This enumerat ion of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
Sec . 26. [Prov i s ions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
Sec . 27. [ F u n d a m e n t a l r ights . ] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 1896 
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Sec. 28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
(1) To preserve and protect victims' r ights to justice and due 
process, victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law: 
(a) l b be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, 
and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the 
criminal justice process; 
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and 
to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related 
to the victim, either in person or through a lawful repre-
sentative, once a criminal information or indictment 
charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and 
(c) l b have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider, 
without evidentiary limitation, reliable information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a 
person convicted of an offense except tha t this subsection 
does not apply to capital cases or si tuations involving 
privileges. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a 
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or 
for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal 
judgment. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony 
crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile 
offenses, as the Legislature may provide. 
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and 
define this section by statute. 1994 
Sec. 29. [Marriage.] 
(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man 
and a woman. 
(2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be 
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially 




1. [State boundaries.] 
Section 1. [State boundaries.] 
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as follows: 
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of the 
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, with 
the thirty-seventh degree of north lat i tude; thence due west 
along said thirty-seventh degree of north lat i tude to the 
intersection of the same with the thirty-seventh degree of 
longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said 
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to t he intersection of 
the same with the forty-second degree of north latitude; 
thence due east along said forty-second degree of north lati-
tude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-fourth 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south 
along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the inter-
section of the same with the forty-first degree of north lati-
tude; thence due east along said forty-first degree of north 
latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-second 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south 
along said thirty-second degree of west longitude to the place 




[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] -
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of 
lands — Exemption.] 
Section 
[Territorial debts assumed.] 
[Free nonsectarian schools.] 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the 
consent of the United States and the people of this State: 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] 
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaran-
teed. No inhabi tant of this State shall ever be molested in 
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited. 1896 
[Right to publ i c d o m a i n disc la imed — Taxation of l a n d s 
— Exempt ion . ] 
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and 
declare tha t they forever disclaim all right and title to the 
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries 
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held 
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and tha t until the title thereto 
shall have been extinguished by the United States, t he same 
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United 
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. 
The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing 
without this State shall never be taxed at a higher r a te than 
the lands belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in 
this ordinance shall preclude this s ta te from taxing, as other 
lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who 
has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained from the 
United States or from any person, by patent or other grant , a 
title thereto, save and except such lands as have been or may 
be granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress, 
containing a provision exempting the lands thus granted from 
taxation, which last mentioned lands shall be exempt from 
taxation so long, and to such extent, as is or may be provided 
in the act of Congress granting the same. 1945 
[Territorial deb t s assumed. ] 
Third: — All debts and liabilities of the Territory of Utah, 
incurred by authori ty of the Legislative Assembly thereof, are 
hereby assumed and shall be paid by this State. 1896 
[Free nonsectarian schools.] 
Fourth: — The Legislature shall make laws for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which 
shall be open to all the children of the State and be free from 
sectarian control. 1896 
ARTICLE IV 
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE 
Section 
1. [Equal political rights.] 
2. [Qualifications to vote.] 
3. [Voters — Immuni ty from arrest.] 
4. [Voters — Immuni ty from militia duty] 
5. [Voters to be citizens of United States.] 
6. [Mentally incompetent persons, convicted felons, and cer-
ta in criminals ineligible to vote.] 
7. [Property qualification forbidden.] 
8. [Ballot to be secret.] 
9. [General and special elections — Terms — Election of 
local officers.] 
10. [Oath of office.] 
Section 1. [Equal political rights.] 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold 
office shall not be denied or -abridged on* account of sex. Both 
male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all 
civil, political and religious rights and privileges. ' 1896 
APPENDIX 2 
1. Purpose & Background 
A. These procedures establish the rules for: 
1. the composition, nomination and election of the Employee Appeals Board; 
2. the filing of appeals to the Employee Appeals Board; 
3. the exercise of the Employee Appeals Board's authority, including conduct of hearings; 
4. the standard of review applicable to matters heard by the Employee Appeals Board. 
B. The Employee Appeals Board is created and functions under Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 & 
1106 of the Utah Code, as such statutes may be amended from time to time. The Board has authority to 
investigate, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter that relates to the cause 
for an employee discharge, suspension without pay for more than two days (2 shifts for employees who 
work shifts longer than 8 hours) or involuntary transfer from one position to another with less 
remuneration. 
C. The Board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel matters. The Board has no 
authority to award attorney's fees or costs to either party. Additionally, the Board has no authority to 
determine the City's legal liability under federal or state law. 
D. Any City officer or employee to which these procedures apply may appeal a discharge, suspension 
without pay for more than two days (2 shifts for employees who work shifts longer than 8 hours) or 
involuntary transfer from one position to another with less remuneration, to the Employee Appeals 
Board. 
E. These procedures shall apply to each employee of the City, except the following employees: 
1. an officer appointed by the Mayor or the Mayor's designee; 
2. a member of the police department or fire department who is a member of the classified 
civil service; 
3. a police chief; 
4. a deputy police chief; 
5. a fire chief; 
6. a deputy or assistant fire chief; 
7. a head of a City department; 
8. a deputy of a head of a City department; 
9. a superintendent; 
10. a probationary employee; 
11. an hourly part-time employee; 
12. seasonal employee; or 
13. any other at-will employee 
F. The City labor relations officer in the Management Services Department is responsible for 
coordinating with the applicable departments that will conduct nominations and elections for elected 
Board members, coordinating with the Mayor regarding appointments to the pool of appointed Board 
members, impaneling an Employee Appeals Board from die pool of appointed and elected Board 
members to hear each appeal and providing staff support to the Employee Appeals Board. The City 
Attorney shall train and advise the City labor relations officer in all matters relating to the Board's 
authority and due process. 
G. As required by Utah Code, the Employee Appeals Board must certify its decision to the City 
Recorder within fifteen (15) business days after the Board receives an appeal, unless for good cause the 
Board extends the fifteen (15) day period up to a maximum of 60 calendar days, with the consent of the 
employee and the City. The following procedures are necessary to assure the Board can effectively 
render its decision within the statutorily required time. 
II. Board Members Selection Procedures 
A. The City shall establish a pool of Board members, which shall include fourteen (14) persons: 4 
appointed members and 10 elected members (elected members shall consist of five 100/200 series 
employees and five 300/600 series employees). 
1. Appointed Board Members. The Mayor shall appoint four (4) persons to serve on the 
Board. The next appointment process shall begin in sufficient time for new Board members to be 
in place by October 1,2005. The terms of appointed persons serving on the Employee Appeals 
Board shall be three years and shall begin upon the date of the person's appointment. In the event 
of a vacancy created by the resignation of an appointed person or by termination for cause, the 
Mayor may appoint a new person to fill the remaining term of the person who resigned or was 
otherwise removed from the Board. 
2. Elected Board Members. The pool of elected Board members shall consist of one (1) 
100/200 series employee and one (1) 300/600 series employee from each of the following 
departments: (1) Department of Airports, (2) Public Services, (3) Public Utilities, (4) Community 
Development, and (5) Management Services and other areas or divisions not included in the 
other four departments listed. 
a. Every three years the (1) Department of Airports, (2) Public Services, (3) Public 
Utilities (4) Community Development and (5) Management Services (including all other 
areas and divisions not enumerated above except Police and Fire) shall solicit 
nominations of employees within the respective department or area and conduct elections 
for the pool of elected Employee Appeals Board members. Nominations must be open 
for a minimum often (10) days. Nominees must be full-time City employees. 
b. At least one and no more than five (5) 100/200 series employees and at least one and 
no more than five (5) 300/600 series employees from each of the respective departments 
set forth above shall be included on the list of nominees on the election ballot 
c. In the event more than 5 nominations are received in any department listed above for 
each of the two employee groups (100/200 and 300/600), the department may conduct a 
preliminary election within such department to limit the number of nominees as set forth 
in paragraph 2.b, above. 
d. After nominees are identified, the respective departments shall conduct elections. 
The election shall be by secret ballot. Each City employee or officer in each of the 
departments shall be entitled to cast two votes for nominees in their own department: one 
vote for a 100/200 series nominee and another vote for a 300/600 series nominee. City 
employees and officers who are not in the Department of Airports, Public Services, 
Community Development, Public Utilities, Police Department or Fire Department shall 
be entitled to vote on nominees in Management Services. One 100/200 series nominee 
and one 300/600 series nominee with the most votes from each department shall 
comprise the pool of elected persons for the Employee Appeals Board. In case of a tie in 
any department, the Mayor shall cast the deciding vote. 
e. Elected Board members shall serve for three year terms, except for any person 
who fills the remaining term of a person who has resigned or otherwise been removed 
from the Board. The next nomination period shall begin in sufficient time for new Board 
members to be in place by October 1,2005. Every three years thereafter, the respective 
departments shall conduct elections in sufficient time for .the terms of elected Board 
members to begin on October 1 of the year in which they are elected. 
f. If a an elected Board member resigns or is otherwise removed from the Board, the 
remaining elected Board members shall promptly meet and elect, by majority vote, 
another person from the same department and employee classification series (100/200 or 
300/600) as the departing Board member to fill the remaining term of the person who 
resigns or is otherwise removed from the Board. The City labor relations officer shall 
assist the Board members to develop a list of nominees. 
B. The Mayor or the Mayor's designee may remove any Board member for cause. 
HI, Appeal Filing Process 
A. Any City officer or employee to whom these procedures apply may appeal a discharge, 
suspension without pay for more than two (2) days (2 shifts for employees who work shifts longer than 
8 hours) or an involuntary transfer from one position to another with less remuneration to the Employee 
Appeals Board. All requests for appeals must be in writing, addressed to the City Recorder and filed 
with the City Recorder within the time limitations contained in these procedures. 
B. The notice of appeal shall be in writing and filed before the close of the tenth business day 
following the employee's receipt of a written decision by the employee's department head effecting or 
upholding the disciplinary action at issue. The notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant 
employee, or by his or her attorney or representative. 
C. The Notice of Appeal shall be in the form or contain the information as set forth in Appendix 
"A." The form is available at the City Attorney's Office, the City Human Resources office or online at 
the City's website. The Notice of Appeal must (a) set forth with specificity any issue the employee 
raised in the appeal before the department head and which the employee intends to raise on appeal to 
the Board (the employee may not raise any issues before the Board that were not raised in the appeal 
before the department head); (b) include copies of any documents the employee intends to introduce at 
the hearing. 
D. To be considered by the Employee Appeals Board, the Notice of Appeal must be filed in the 
Office of the City Recorder within the time limit specified. The Board has no authority or jurisdiction to 
hear an appeal that is filed beyond the time limits specified in this procedure or filed anywhere other 
than with the Office of the City Recorder. 
E. The Office of the City Recorder is located in Room 415, City & County Building, 451 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
F. Upon receipt of a written appeal, the City Recorder shall immediately provide a copy of the 
appeal to the City labor relations officer and to the City Attorney. 
G. If there is a question whether a City employee is within the class of persons who may appeal a 
discharge, suspension or transfer, the Board shall request an opinion from the City Attorney regarding 
that issue. The City Attorney shall render an opinion no later than the next business day after a request is 
received. 
H. Any person who voluntarily terminates his or her employment with the City may not appeal his or 
her release from employment to the Employee Appeals Board. 
IV, Impaneling a Board for each Appeal 
A. When an employee files an appeal, the City labor relations officer shall impanel a Board to hear 
such appeal from the pool of Employee Appeals Board members. Each such Board shall consist of five 
(5) members. 
B. The City labor relations officer shall impanel members for each appeal who are least likely to 
have personal knowledge of the cause for the appellant's discharge, suspension or transfer. The City 
labor relations officer shall designate one of the Board members as the Chairperson for the subject 
appeal and notify that member of his or her designation. At the same time the Board members and the 
Chairperson receive their notification, the City labor relations officer shall notify the department head of 
each impaneled Board member. The notification to the respective department heads shall state that the 
duties of the Board member take precedence over all other duties. 
C. As soon as reasonably possible after the labor relations officer receives the appeal, the labor 
relations officer shall notify the appellant, the affected City department, the Board members, and the 
City Attorney of the date, time, and location the Board will hear the appeal While the labor relations 
officer may consider requests from either party for a particular hearing date, the availability of the Board 
members and other requirements imposed by law will constrain the ability of the Board to accommodate 
the parties. 
D. Board members shall receive no additional compensation or benefits beyond their City salary or 
wages for their service as Board members. However, Board members who are Fair Labor Standards Act 
non-exempt employees shall be paid their regular rate of pay for time worked for their duties and such 
time worked shall be considered in determining the City's overtime liability during the work weeks in 
which the employee serves as a Board member. 
V, Appellant's Rights on Appeal 
A. An appellant may be represented by any person of his or her choice to act as an advocate at any 
level of the appeal procedure. 
B. An appellant may request City employees and other persons to appear as witnesses during the 
appeal proceedings and may present any relevant information in mitigation. Such witnesses and 
information must relate directly to (1) the cause for the action taken, as set forth in the disciplinary 
decision letter, and (2) any issues raised by either party at the proceeding before the department head. 
C. An appellant may cross-examine any witnesses called by the City department during the appeal 
proceedings. An appellant may inspect documents offered by the City department and may offer 
evidence in explanation and rebuttal. 
D. No City employee may take any reprisals against anyone who participates in an appeal proceeding 
under this procedure. 
E. If the Employee Appeals Board finds in favor of the employee, the next business day after the 
Board's decision is certified to the City Recorder an employee who has been discharged or involuntarily 
transferred to a position of less remuneration shall be restored to his or her former position; The 
employee shall receive the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is 
discharged, or suspended without pay, or any deficiency in salary for the period during which the 
employee was transferred to a position of less remuneration. 
VI, Pre-hearing Procedures 
A. The appellant employee or City department may file with the Board prior to the hearing any 
relevant documents or written arguments that directly relate to (1) the cause for the discharge or transfer 
as set forth in the disciplinary decision letter, and (2) any issues raised at the appeal to the department 
head.. In case of such a filing, the appellant or City department shall make six copies of such documents 
or written arguments for the Board and one copy for the other party to the proceeding. The six copies of 
relevant documents or written arguments for the Board shall be filed with the City labor relations 
officer. The party filing such documents or written arguments shall provide a copy of such documents or 
written arguments to the other party to the proceeding the same day as any filing with the Board. 
B. In each case of the filing of relevant documents or written arguments, the City labor relations 
officer shall immediately distribute one copy of such materials to each impaneled Board member. The 
City labor relations officer shall request that each member take any necessary work time to read and 
review any materials. The City labor relations officer shall request that the department head of each 
Board member authorize work time for Board members to review materials received. 
C. At any time prior to the hearing, the Board Chair may meet with the parties in a pre-hearing 
conference. The pre-hearing conference is intended as a mechanism to expedite the proceeding and will 
not be used to stall or unnecessarily delay the hearing process. At the discretion of the Board Chair, the 
pre-hearing conference may be conducted telephonically. At the conference, the Board Chair may 
require the parties to submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and documents that each party intends to offer 
in evidence; submit a joint statement detailing stipulated facts not in dispute; submit a joint statement 
narrowing the matters for consideration by the Board; and make other orders to facilitate an efficient 
and effective hearing. The pre-hearing conference is informal and not open to the public. Submissions of 
required information from the pre-hearing conference shall be to the City labor relations officer, 
D. The Board has no legal authority to issue subpoenas. If a party to the proceeding requests that 
certain information or persons be subpoenaed, the Board shall request the Office of the City Attorney to 
issue the subject subpoena. The Board has the authority to quash any subpoena issued by the City 
Attorney or issued by any other office or authority regarding matters that are pending before the Board. 
E. The Board has the authority to direct the participation or attendance of any City employee in the 
Board's proceedings. Any employee who fails to comply with a Board directive to participate or attend 
a Board proceeding shall be subject to discipline as determined by the employee's department head. 
VH. Hearing Procedures 
A. The City labor relations officer shall employ a court reporter to record the hearing and prepare an 
official transcript of the hearing. The official transcript of the hearing and all exhibits, written 
arguments, and other evidence received by the Board shall be the official record of the Employee 
Appeals Board proceeding. 
B. Board hearings are considered open meetings under Utah law. The Board may close a hearing by 
complying with the procedures and requirements of Utah Code Annotated Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and 
Public Meetings. 
C. Board hearings are not judicial or quasi-judicial process. They shall, hovvever, be conducted with 
appropriate formality and decorum so that the due process rights of all parties are protected and the 
Board may perform its function. Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are used as 
guidelines in the conduct of Board hearings, but are not strictly followed or applied. The Board shall not 
strictly apply rules of evidence regarding authentication, foundation, or hearsay. 
D. Upon motion of either party, the Board may invoke the exclusionary rule for witnesses. However, 
one department representative of the City's choice will be allowed to remain present at all times. 
E. The City labor relations officer will serve as procedural advisor to the Board and will assist the 
Board in maintaining order in the proceedings. 
F. Unless the Board Chair rules otherwise for good cause, the hearing should proceed as follows: 
1. The Board Chair opens the hearing and asks if the parties are ready. The Board Chair may 
ask that a summary of any pre-hearing proceedings or activity be placed in the record. 
2. Each party makes an opening statement. The City department makes its opening statement 
first. 
3. The City department presents evidence. The representative of the City department asks the 
witnesses questions. After the City representative has questioned each witness, the employee or 
the representative for the employee is entitled to cross-examine the witness. After cross-
examination, the City may ask questions relating to the subject of the cross-examination, 
4. After the City department has presented its evidence, the employee or employee's 
representative calls witnesses and presents evidence. After the employee or the employee's 
representative has questioned each witness, the representative of the City department is entitled 
to cross-examine the witness. After cross-examination, the employee or representative for the 
employee may ask questions relating to the subject of the cross-examination. 
5. After all witnesses and evidence have been presented, each party makes a closing statement. 
Ordinarily, the City department makes its closing statement first The employee or employee 
representative makes his/her statement next. The City is then entitled to make a final statement to 
discuss any issues raised in the closing statement of the employee or employee's representative. 
6. After the closing statements, the Board Chair thanks everyone and closes the hearing so the 
Board may consider the matter. 
G, Following the hearing, the Board shall meet in a duly noticed, closed meeting to deliberate and 
reach a decision. The ruling of the Board shall be based on a majority vote of the members. The Board 
may only uphold or overturn the decision of the Department. The Board may not modify the decision of 
the Department. The Board shall vote by secret ballot using the following standard of review: 
1. Do the facts support the need for discipline or, in the case of a non-disciplinary discharge, 
the need for remedial action to be taken by the department head? In other words, was action 
warranted? If the City's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 
entirety, the decision should be upheld, even though the Board may have weighed the evidence 
differently had it been in the department head's position. In order to overturn a disciplinary 
action, the Board must have a definite and firm conviction that the department head's decision 
was clearly erroneous. 
In an appeal where an employee was discharged, not for disciplinary reasons but because the 
employee was no longer able or qualified to do the job, the Board's analysis shall end with the 
analysis set forth in subsection 1, above. However, in an appeal of a disciplinary action the 
Board shall proceed to step 2 of the analysis, as set forth below, 
2. In a disciplinary action, if the facts support the need for discipline, is the action taken 
proportionate to the discipline imposed? Discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within 
the discretion of the department head Unless the Board finds the discipline imposed is so harsh 
as to constitute an abuse, rather than an exercise of the department head's discretion, the decision 
of the department head should be upheld. 
Vlll. Board Decision 
After fully hearing the matter on appeal, the Board shall certify its decision with the City Recorder 
within fifteen (15) business days after receipt of the appeal. For good cause, the Board may extend the 
15-day period to a maximum of sixty (60) days, with the consent of the employee and the City. The 
Board shall set forth findings of fact and conclusions based on such findings regarding the issues to be 
decided by the Board, as set forth above in paragraph VII, G. 1 and 2. The Board Chair may sign the 
decision on behalf of the Board. The decision shall be addressed to the appellant, with copies to the head 
of the City department that took the action that was appealed. The City labor relations officer will 
assure that copies of the certified decision are served on the appellant and on the affected department 
head. 
Revised October 17,2005 (Major revision to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 & 1106, 
and to revise board composition and processes ) 
References: Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 & 1106 
Salt Lake City Code 2.52.130,2.24.010 
Memoranda of Understanding with Employee Organizations 
Grievance Procedure for 300, 600 and 700 Series Employees 
Policy 3.02.04 Employee Appeals and Grievances 
Notice of Appeal Before Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board 
APPENDIX A 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
BEFORE 
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD 
NAME OF APPLICANT: 
ADDRESS OF APPLICANT: 
TELEPHONE: WORK HOME 
DEPARTMENT: 
ACTION BEING APPEALED: 
Brief description of action (discharge, suspension, demotion): 
Date of action being appealed: 
Person who took action: 
APPELLANT WILL BE REPRESENTED BY: 
SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL (attach additional pages if necessaiy): 
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DOCUMENTS YOU INTEND TO INTRODUCE AT THE HEARING : 
WHAT ACTON DO YOU WANT THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD TO TAKE: 
I hereby request a hearing before the Employee Appeals Board. 
Signature of Appellant Date 
APPENDIX 3 
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL STAFF REPORT 
BUDGET ANALYSIS - FISCAL YEAR 2008-09 
DATE: May 30, 2008 
BUDGET FOR: EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION - FISCAL YEAR 2008-09 
STAFF REPORT BY: Sylvia Richards 
cc: David Everitt, Lyn Creswell, Steve Fawcett, Sam Guevara, Vic 
Blanton, Ralph Chamness 
Budget Issues and Policy Changes 
Proposed Changes to the Compensation Plan for Appointed Employees and 
Elected Officials 
The Administration recommends the following: 
A. One Compensation Plan for all Appointed Employees: 
All executive and unclassified employees will be consolidated under one 
compensation plan. With the exception of Justice Court Judges, these employees 
are at will, meaning that their employment may be terminated without cause. The 
title of the plan will be Compensation Plan for Appointed Employees and Elected 
Officials. 
The Administration indicates this change will combine pay structures and create 
more logical spacing between pay levels. The Justice Court Judges' positions and 
high-level positions from the Airport and Public Utilities will be housed under this 
plan. As a reminder, this group of employees does not have career protection and 
is not represented by a collective bargaining agreement. 
B. Changes to Severance for Department Heads: 
Changes to the severance policy have been recommended by the Administration. 
Current department heads appointed after January 1, 2000 who terminated not 
for cause and who signed a release of claims shall receive: 
2 months of base salary pay after 1 full year of City employment; 
4 months of base salary pay after 2 full years of City employment; 
6 months of base salary pay after 3 full years of City employment; 
The maximum severance for department heads is 6 months. 
Other Proposed Compensation Plan Changes 
A. Vacation allowance for Recruiting Appointed Employees and 300/600 Series 
Employees: 
The Administration indicates that during tight labor markets there have been 
challenges recruiting for certain positions. As a recruiting incentive, the 
Administration proposes to allow negotiation with prospective appointed or 
1 
professional employee candidates for u p to 120 hours . 
B. Bereavement Policy (citywide): 
The Administration h a s proposed to modify the Bereavement Policy and adopt 
these changes for all employee groups in order to provide a more uniform 
approach citywide. There were some inconsistencies in the policy from one plan to 
another, such a s , t he categories of 'grandfather-in-law and grandmother-in-law 
were excluded from one of the plans. This item h a s been remedied. Also, the term 
'domestic par tner ' was replaced with 'adult designee' in all of the plans. 
C. Sick and Other Related Leave or Personal Leave (proposed option of switching from 
Plan A to Plan B) (citywide): 
City employees who were hired on or before November 16, 1997 have the 
opportunity of switching from Plan A to Plan B during any future city-established 
enrollment periods at a conversion rate of 40 percent. The remaining 60 percent 
of accumulated Plan A (Sick Leave) hours are removed from the books. 
D. Vacation Buyback Policy (citywide): 
The Administration recommends deleting the City's vacation buyback policy from 
all compensation plans . The Administration indicates tha t the policy is difficult to 
administer, and the Administration would prefer to encourage employees to take 
their vacation time ra ther than sell it back to the City. 
Employee Groups 
The City's employee pay s t ructure is a collection of pay grades, each with a pay range 
or one or more pay s teps. In the case of pay ranges, movement of the s t ructure does 
not, in itself, create a salary change; it merely changes the potential for pay 
adjus tments . In contrast , a change in s t ructure containing grades with pay steps 
equates to a corresponding change in pay. The City h a s both k inds of s t ructures: 
ranges are provided for professional and appointed employees; steps are included in all 
other employee groups. 
Following are est imated pay raise costs (percentages) for Fiscal Year 2008-09, 
a ssuming all union contracts are settled a t a 2.7 percent Cost of Living Allowance 
(COLA), p lus merit increases (which occur on the employee's anniversary date). 
100 Series (operations and maintenance employees): The proposed ordinance 
funds a one-year contract memorandum of unders tand ing contract agreed to by the 
City and the American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees Local 1004 
(AFSCME). 
• 2 .7% market adjus tment on J u n e 29, 2008 
• . 45% estimated Merit step cost increase 
• 3 .15% total est imated cost increase 
2 0 0 Series (technical and clerical employees): The proposed ordinance funds a 
one-year memorandum of unders tanding contract agreed to by the City and the 
American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees Local 1004 (AFSCME). 
• 2 .7% market adjus tment on J u n e 29, 2008 
• 0 .86% estimated Merit step cost increase 
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• 3,56% total estimated cost increase 
400 Series (Fire Union): The previously agreed upon ordinance approves a 
memorandum of understanding between Salt Lake City and the Fire Fighters Local. 
The term of agreement is for one year. 
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008 
• 1.28% estimated Merit step cost increase 
• 3.98 total estimated cost increase 
500 Series (Police Union): The ordinance approves a memorandum of understanding 
between Salt Lake City and the International Union of Police Associations, Local 75, 
AFL-CIO. The term of agreement is for one year. 
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008 
• 1.91% estimated Merit step cost increase 
• 4.61% total estimated cost increase 
300 /600 Series (professional): Employees in the 300 series are subject to the 
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and receive overtime or 
compensatory time for time worked over 40 hours per week. Employees in the 600 
series are salaried and exempt from the FLSA provisions. There are 15 grades in the 
300 series (301 to 315) and 15 in the 600 series (601 to 615), but these grades are not 
steps to which employees advance. Each grade has a salary range that reflects the 
normal growth potential. 
The ordinance prepared for 300/600 Series compensation is not negotiated with a 
bargaining unit. However, the Administration does work with a group of employee 
representatives called the Professional Employees Council (PEC) to review the 
implications of proposed changes. 
• 2.7% structure increase and 2.7% general percentage increase (GPP 
• No Merit increases 
• 3.87% total estimated cost increase 
Previously, the Administration used a factoring system for calculating general pay 
increases that provided a percentage increase greater than the GPI when an 
employee's pre-increase salary was below the new midpoint, and an increase smaller 
than the GPI when the employee's pre-increase salary was above the new midpoint. 
This approach has been changed such that when an employee's pre-increase salary is 
above the new midpoint, the increase will be no less than the GPI. In December of 
2007, the Citizens Compensation Advisory Committee (CCAC) observed that some 
private employers and most local public agencies do not use the 'deceleration-above-
midpoint" approach. The CCAC recommended that the City follow the practice of 
other cities, and the Administration acted on this suggestion. The Administration 
indicates that a majority of the City's employees in this plan are currently below the 
midpoint. The Council may wish to ask about the short and long-term costs 
associated with this change. 
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700 Series (regular part-time employees who perform essentially the same duties 
of employees classified by the City as 100 and 200 series): Employees covered by 
this compensation plan regularly work 20 or more hours per week but fewer than 40. 
The plan does not apply to seasonal or temporary employees. Wages are the entry 
level for the applicable job grouping. These employees receive 4 hours of pay for each 
holiday. Vacation leave is granted at half of the amount £>t full-time employees. The 
City contributes to the state retirement system for these employees. The ordinance 
prepared for 700 Series compensation is not negotiated with a bargaining unit. 
• 2.7% market adjustment beginning June 29, 2008 
• No Merit steps 
The Council has discussed the percentage of benefits paid for these part time 
employees previously, and expressed that paying 50 percent of benefits for an 
employee who the City may want to have work 75 percent of the time may not 
be equitable. The Council has received a recommendation from the Citizens 
Compensation Advisory Committee in support of leaving the benefit at 50 
percent, but the Council could elect to make the policy decision to make two 
tiers of benefits for this plan. The Council may wish to ask for a cost estimate 
from the Administration for this approach. 
It should be noted that the Mayor's recommended budget indicates a trend to 
move seasonal employees to this plan, and provide benefits. The Council may 
wish to ask regarding the degree to which the Administration anticipates shifting 
the City's workforce, and the estimated cost as this is phased in. 
800 Series (police sergeants, lieutenants, captains): The ordinance prepared for 
800 Series compensation is not negotiated with a bargaining unit. However, the 
Administration does work with a group of employee representatives (PEC and 
sergeants, lieutenants and captains associations) to review the implications of 
proposed changes. 
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008. 
• 0% estimated Merit step cost increase 
• 2.7% total estimated cost increase 
Employees in the 800 series appear to be presently at their top step, so little or no 
merit step increase is anticipated. 
900 Series (fire captain, battalion chief): The ordinance prepared for the 900 Series 
compensation is not negotiated with a bargaining unit. However, the Administration 
does work with a group of employee representatives (PEC) to review the implications of 
proposed changes. 
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008 
• 0.23% estimated Merit step cost increase 
• 2.93% total estimated cost increase 
Most employees in the 900 series are presently at their top step, so merit or step 
increase is minimal. 
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Appointed Employees (Includes employees currently classified as Executives and 
employees currently occupying Unclassified positions): Unclassified employees 
presently include Justice Court Judges, non-executive appointed staff in the Mayor's 
Office, Council Office, City Attorney's Office, and administrative secretaries of 
department directors. As mentioned on page one of this report, the Administration 
has proposed to move all Appointed employees, including executives and unclassified 
employees, to the Compensation Plan for Appointed Employees and Elected Officials. 
Appointed employees are "at will" and subject to termination without cause. 
Appointed employees' salaries become subject to midpoint control; midpoints increase 
by 5.40% to 9.90% for department and division directors (currently classified as 
"executives"). Base pay is limited to 110% of midpoint. A general percentage increase 
of '2.7% is applied to new structure. Performance-based portion (if any) of pay increase 
is not added to base salary. 
• 4.28% total estimated cost increase 
• No Merit steps 
Elected Officials: 
In accordance with Resolution No. 70 of 1993, elected officials' salary for fiscal year 
2009 is based in part on a national survey of capital cities having a Mayor-Council 
form of government and populations in the 100,000 to 400,000 range. The Council 
may wish to confirm interest in asking the CCAC to consider modifying the 
methodology of selecting comparable cities for the national surveys for elected 
officials. 
• Based on survey results, the increase is 0.8% 
• No merit steps 
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COMPENSATION PLAN FOR SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION APPOINTED 
EMPLOYEES AND ELECTED OFFICIALS 
http://slcilp.slcgovxom/LaborDo . 9/29/2008 
I. EFFECTIVE DATE 
The provisions of this plan shall be effective commencing July 1,2008. 
II, EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THIS PLAN 
Employees subject to this plan shall be the Elected Officials and those full-time City employees 
classified as "Appointed" employees. "Appointed" employees are appointed and, with the 
exception of Justice Court Judges who are covered under this plan, are "at-will" employees 
serving at the pleasure of the Mayor (or the City Council if they are employees of the Office of 
the City Council). Employees are not covered by the paid leave provisions of this plan while 
they are on unpaid leave of absence. However, employees on an unpaid military leave of 
absence may be entitled to the restoration of certain leave benefits as provided by city ordinance. 
WAGES AND SALARIES 
A. Elected Officials 
The annual compensation of elected officials shall be as provided in APPENDIX "A." 
B. Appointed Employees 
From June 29, 2008 to June 30,2009, Appointed employees shall be paid within ranges 
provided in the schedule attached hereto as APPENDIX "B." Any performance-based 
pay adjustment above the "Base Pay Maximum" of the range will be given as a 
supplemental payment not added to base. In no case will such annual supplemental 
payments when divided by 26 and added to the base pay adjustment3/^ allowed to 
exceed the "Range Top." 
C. Other Forms of Compensation 
The foregoing shall not restrict the Mayor or the City Council from distributing 
appropriated moneys to employees of the City in the form of discretionary lump sum 
supplemental performance-based or special supplemental payments to employees within 
per annum pay limitations. The Mayor or the City Council may also grant a discretionary 
retention incentive benefit, if one is necessary to meet employment market conditions or 
where it would be in the City's best interests to do so. 
XVI. SEVERANCE BENEFIT 
A. Subject to availability of funds, current Appointed employees shall receive the following 
severance benefit on termination of their employment: 
1. Current Appointed Employees, Who Were Appointed Before January 1, 1989. 
Current Appointed employees, who were appointed before January 1, 1989, shall 
receive a severance benefit determined as follows: 
a. Appointed employees who have an account, established by prior City 
policy, and which was credited with a cash value equal to the total accrued sick 
leave hours available to the employee on December 31, 1988, multiplied by said 
employee's hourly rate of pay in effect on December 31, 1988, are vested in that 
account. The hours included in this account are separately accounted for and are 
not included in the "Plan B Retirement Benefit" under VIILE.8.a. 
Upon the voluntary or involuntary termination of employment from the City, 
these Appointed employees shall receive, at the time of separation, the cash value 
of their vested account. However, Appointed employees, may, during their 
employment, use the hours in that account for sick leave purposes, although such 
use will reduce the cash value of the account. 
b. Current Appointed employees, appointed before January 1, 1989, who are 
terminated not for cause, and who execute a release of all claims approved by the 
City Attorney's Office, shall receive, as a severance benefit, in addition to 
subparagraph A. 1 .a. above: One month's base salary pay, determined on the 
effective date of termination, for each year of City employment calculated on a 
pro-rata basis, not to exceed 6 months' base salary. This additional severance 
benefit shall be provided only if the termination from City employment is 
involuntary. 
2. Current Appointed employees appointed on or after January L 1989 and before 
January h 2000. who are terminated not for cause, and who execute a release of all 
claims approved by the City Attorney's Office, shall receive a severance benefit, but only 
for an involuntary termination from City employment. 
The severance benefit for said employees shall be: One month's base salary pay, 
for each year of City employment before January 1, 2000, calculated on a pro-rata 
basis, not to exceed 6 months' salary. 
3. Current Department heads appointed on or after January 1. 2000 who are 
terminated not for cause, and who execute a release of all claims approved by the City 
Attorney's Office, shall receive a severance benefit, but only for an involuntary 
termination from City employment. 
The severance benefit for said employees shall be: Two months' base salary pay, 
determined on the effective date of termination, after one full year of City 
employment, four months' base salary pay after two full years of City 
employment, or six months' base salary pay after three full years of City 
employment. 
4. Current Appointed employees who are not Department heads, and who were 
appointed on or after January 1. 2000, who are terminated not for cause, and who 
execute a release of all claims approved by the City Attorney's Office, shall receive a 
severance benefit, but only for an involuntary termination from City employment. 
The severance benefit for said employees shall be: One week's base salary pay, 
determined on the effective date of termination, for each year of City employment 
calculated on a pro-rata basis, not to exceed 6 weeks' base salary. 
5. Current Appointed employees with leave hour account balances under Plan A or 
Plan B, and who execute a release of all claims approved by the City Attorney's Office, 
shall, in addition to the severance benefit provided under paragraph 1., or paragraph 2., 
or paragraph 3. in this section XVI. A., receive a severance benefit equal to the 
"retirement benefit" value provided under section VIII. E. 4. or VIII.F.8, if separation is 
involuntary and not for cause. 
6. Not Eligible for Benefit. The severance benefit provided herein shall not be granted 
to the following employees: 
a. An employee who, at the time of termination of employment, has been 
convicted, indicted, charged or is under active criminal investigation concerning a 
public offense involving a felony or moral turpitude. This provision shall not 
restrict the award of full severance benefits should such employee subsequently 
be found not guilty of such charge or if the charges are otherwise dismissed. 
b. An employee who has been terminated or asked for a resignation by the 
Mayor, Chief Administrative Officer or Department Director under bona fide 
charges of nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in office. 
c. An employee who fails to execute a Release of All Claims approved by the 
City Attorney's Office, where required as stipulated above. 
7. Replaces Retirement Election. An employee who elects and is paid a benefit by the 
City pursuant to retirement election is not eligible to receive a severance benefit as 
provided herein, except as provided under paragraph A.I.a. above. 
XVII. AUTHORITY OF THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL 
Employees covered by this compensation plan may be appointed, classified, and advanced 
under rules and regulations promulgated by the Mayor, the Civil Service Commission, or the 
City Council, if applicable, within budget limitations established by the City Council. 

































































































No position may be removed from or 
added to this Appointed Employee Pay Plan 






Chief Administrative Officer 
City Attorney 
002 
Chief of Staff 
Police Chief 
Public Services Director 
Management Services Director 
Fire Chief 
Deputy City Attorney 
City Council Office Exec 
Director 
003 
Public Services Deputy Director 
Chief Information Officer 
Communication Director 
Senior Advisor - Mayor 
Finance Director 
City Prosecutor 
Airport Operations Director 
Airport Maintenance Director 
P. Util. Finance Administrator 
Airport Finance/Acct Director 
Information Mgt Serv Dir -
Airport 
Airport Engineering Director 
Airport Admin/Comm Director 
Redevelopment Director 
City Council Deputy Director 
Appointed Sr. City Attorney 
Airport Police Chief 
City Engineer 
Public Utilities Deputy Director 
Level 004 
Assistant Police Chief 
Planning Director 
DCED Dep Director - Comm 
Dev 
005 




Sorensen Center Director 
Chief Procurement Officer 
City Courts Director 
007 
Public Policy Analyst 
Const Liaison/Pub Pol Analyst 
Community Facilitator 
DCED Dep Director - Econ 
Dev 
City Treasurer 
Human Resources Director 
Deputy Fire Chief 
Airport Plan/Cap Prog Dir 
Wtr. Quality/Treat 
Administrator 
Dep City Eng/Major Projects 
Transportation Engineer 
Public Utilities Chief Engineer 
Civilian Review Bd Investigator 
Sustainability Director 




Coord For Human Rights/Divers 
Assistant Communication Dir 
Assistant To Chief of Staff 




Assistant To The Mayor 
Administrative Assistant 





Airport PR/Marketing Director Downtown Transp Dev Coord 
Comp Adm/EE Rel Coordinator Emergency Mgt Program Dir 
City Recorder 
010 011 
Council Constituent Liaison 
Econ Dev Mgr Small Business 
Const Liaison/Budget Analyst 





Admin Asst To Office of Mayor 
Staff Assistant 




Executive Office Assistant 
097 
Justice Court Judge 
099 
Executive Director Of Airports 
098 
Public Utilities Director 
DCED Director 
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Salt Lake City Corporation, 
Respondent. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Case No. 20070863 
PURSUANT TO RULE 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner 
Jodi Howick ("Howick") submits this Docketing Statement. 
1. Nature of the proceeding. This appeal is from the final action or 
order of Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") on the Notice of Appeal of her 
termination filed by Howick before the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board 
on September 10, 2007. 
2. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 10-3-1106(6). 
3. Relevant dates. 
A. Date the final judgment or order appealed from was entered: 
September 21,2007. 
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B. Date the notice of appeal or petition for review was filed: 
October 22, 2007. 
C. (1) Date any motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 
59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 were filed: None. 
4. Appellant is not an inmate. 
5. Rule 54(b), This appeal is not from an order in a multiple-party or 
multiple-claim case in which the judgment had been certified as a final judgment 
by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. This is not a criminal case. 
7. Issues on appeal. Howick intends to assert the following issue(s) on 
appeal: 
A. Issue: Salt Lake City exceeded its statutory authority and 
violated the Utah Municipal Code by attempting to create or creating at-will 
positions not authorized by and contrary to the Utah Municipal Code and 
terminating Howick's employment pursuant to such status. 
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-702,10-3-815, 
10-3-1105, 10-3-1106 and 10-3-1221: University of Utah v. Shurtleff. 144P.3d 
1109 (Utah 2006); Salt Lake City v. Sutter. 216 P. 234 (Utah 1923); Draughon v. 
Dept. of Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1999); Lorenc v. Call 
789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 1989). 
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Standard of Review: De novo review for correctness. Mouty 
v. Sandy City, 122 P.3d 521 (Utah App. 2005). 
B. Issue: Salt Lake City violated the Utah Municipal Code and 
its own ordinances, policies and procedures by denying Howick access to the 
appeal process established for City employees to appeal termination decisions. To 
the extent the City's policies and procedures are interpreted to create a class of 
at-will employees who are not entitled to the protection of Utah Code Annotated § 
10-3-1106 in addition to those identified by the Utah Municipal Code, they violate 
the Utah Municipal Code. 
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-702,10-3-815, 
10-3-1105, 10-3-1106 and 10-3-1221; Salt Lake City Code §§ 2.53.030(a); 
2.53.020; Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board Procedures; Carrier v. Salt 
Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004); Draughon v. Dept. of Financial 
Institutions, 975 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1999). 
Standard of review: De novo review for correctness. Mouty 
v. Sandy City, 122 P.3d 521 (Utah App. 2005). 
C. Issue: Salt Lake City acting under color of state law violated 
Howick's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and thereby violated 42 United States Code § 1983 and under Article 
1, § 7 of the Utah Constitution by terminating her employment on an at-will basis 
and denying her access to the appeal process established by the Utah Municipal 
Code for City employees to appeal termination decisions. 
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Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 
1106; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Spackman v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Box Elder County School District 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000). 
Standard of Review: De novo for correctness. Strawberry 
Elec. Serv. Dist v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870 (Utah 1996). 
d. Issue: Howick is entitled to attorney's fees under the Court's 
inherent power in the interest of justice and equity, under the due process 
provisions of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and as 
damages for her termination. 
Determinative law: Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 
P.2d 759 (Utah 1994); Lorenc v. Call 789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 1989); Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). 
Standard of review: Within the Court's discretion. Stewart v. 
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994); Prince v. Tooele County 
Hous. Autlu 834 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1992). 
8. Factual summary. In 1998 the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
purported to create a new at-will attorney position outside of the City's merit 
system. Attorneys working in the Office were asked to agree to move to the 
newly-created positions in exchange for a raise in pay. In August 2007, Howick's 
employment was terminated without notice after 15 years of excellent 
performance explicitly on the basis of her at will status and in fact for reasons that 
violated the protections afforded to merit system employees pursuant to the Utah 
4 
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Municipal Code. Howick asked several times to meet with Salt Lake City to 
discuss the basis of its action, but Salt Lake City refused to meet. 
Howick then appealed her termination to the Salt Lake City Employee 
Appeals Board in accordance with the Utah Municipal Code and Salt Lake City 
Ordinances and Policies. Salt Lake City's Labor Relations Officer, who staffs the 
City's Employee Appeals Board but has no substantive responsibilities in the 
appeal process, refused to initiate the appeals process and wrote to Howick giving 
the Labor Relations Officer's opinion that Howick was an at-will employee and 
therefore not entitled to an appeal. 
Howick contacted Salt Lake City pointing out that the Labor Relations 
Officer's action was contrary to both state law and City Ordinance and Policy and 
asked whether in spite of the unlawful nature of her action, the Labor Relations 
Officer's letter would be certified as the final action of the Employee Appeals 
Board as required by statute. At first Salt Lake City represented in writing that the 
Labor Relations Officer's letter was not Salt Lake City's final action on Howick's 
appeal of her termination. Three days later the City reversed its position and 
informed Howick in writing that no further action would be taken on her appeal to 
the Employee Appeals Board. 
9. Assignment. This appeal is not subject to transfer by the Supreme 
Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4). 
10. Related appeals. There are no related appeals. 
11. Attachments. The following are attached: 
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A. The final order or action from which the appeal is taken: 
letter of Jamey Knighton, Salt Lake City Labor Relations Officer, dated 
September 21,2007, attached as Exhibit A. 
B. Correspondence from Howick requesting clarification of 
whether Exhibit A constitutes the final decision of Salt Lake City, attached as 
Exhibit B. 
C. Correspondence first denying and then confirming that 
Exhibit A constitutes the final decision of Salt Lake City, attached as Exhibit C. 
D. Howick's Notice of Appeal to the Salt Lake City Employee 
Appeal Board, filed with the Salt Lake City Recorder on September 10, 2007, 
attached as Exhibit D. 
E. The Notice of Appeal to this Court attached as Exhibit E. 
There are no orders extending the time for the filing of a notice of appeal. 
F. There is no notice of claim. 
G. There are no motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), 
54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, or Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6. 
H. Appellant is not an inmate. 
Dated this 13^~ day of November, 2007. 
Elikqbet^ T. Dunning, Esq. ( j 
Attorney of Record 
#231528 vS 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Docketing Statement 
was mailed by first class mail this \ Q day of November, 2007, to the following: 
Mark Gavre 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




J A M E Y K N I G H T O N 
(IRECTOR, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
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D E P A R T M E N T O F M A N A G E M E N T S E R V I C E S 
D I V I S I O N O F H U M A N R E S O U R C E M A N A G E M E N T 
September 21,2007 
R O S S C. " R O C K Y " A N D E R S O N 
MAYOR 
RECEIVED 
SEP 24 2007 
Holme, Roberts &
 Owen, LLP 
VIA FAX (521-9639) and U.S. MAIL 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2263 
Re: Jodi Howick 
Dear Ms. Dunning, 
This letter is in response to the "Notice of Appeal before Salt Lake City Employee 
Appeals Board" you filed on Jodi Howick's behalf. In my role as the Labor Relations 
Office, I am responsible for the administration of the city's Employee Appeals Board 
policy and procedures. The City's EAB procedures identify specific employee 
classifications that are excluded from the right to appeal an employment action to the 
EAB. 
I have carefully reviewed the policies, procedures and ordinances that pertain to the 
Employee Appeals Board and have determined the Employees Appeal Board does not 
have jurisdiction to review the termination of appointed or at-will employees. Because 
Ms. Howick was an Appointed Senior City Attorney, the appeals board does not have 
jurisdiction to hear her appeal. As a result, the appeal will not be forwarded to a hearing 
board. 
Sincerely, 
1(Pnu^j / t W ^ 
9
 {#*>) 
Jamey Knighton, SPHR; CCP 
Director of Human Resources 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
cc: EdRutan 
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Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
SALT LAKE CITY SENT VIA FACSIMILE 




Ralph E. Chamness 
COLORADO SPRINGS Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
451 South State, Suite 505A 






Re: Jodi Howick 
Dear Ralph: 
I received a brief letter from Jamey Knighton, Director of Human Resources, 
on September 21,2007, informing me that, acting in her position as labor 
relations officer, she has determined that the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals 
Board does not have jurisdiction to review Ms. Howick's appeal of her 
discharge. Ms. Knighton's letter raises serious concerns. 
Under the Employee Appeals Board Procedures ("Procedures"), the City labor 
relations officer's duties are limited to coordinating the election and 
appointment of Employee Appeals Board members and providing staff support 
to the Board. See Procedures, Section I.F. Under Section IILG of the 
Procedures, the Board in the first instance determines if there is a question 
whether a City employee is within the class of persons who may appeal a 
discharge, and if there is a question, the Board is required to request an opinion 
from the City Attorney. Ms. Knighton's letter does not comply with these 
Procedures, is arbitrary and constitutes a denial of process. 
If Ms. Knighton sought legal advice prior to preparing her September 21 letter, 
this raises additional concerns. The Procedures provide that the City Attorney 
shall train and advise the City labor relations officer in all matters related to the 
Board's authority and due process. See Procedures, Section I.F. In this case, 
such advice raises the same issue about conflict of interest that seeking a formal 
Elizabeth T. Dunning elizabeth.dunning@hro.com 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Sait Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 tel 801.521.5800 fax 801.521.9639 
#230095 vl 
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Attorneys at Law 
Ralph E. Chamness 
September 28, 2007 
Page 2 
opinion from the City Attorney under Section IILG. would present. If Ms. 
Knighton sought legal advice from her immediate supervisor, Lyn Creswell, 
who is an attorney, the conflict of interest issue remains because, although he is 
currently serving as Salt Lake City Chief Administrative Officer, he retains the 
right to return to his senior attorney position in the City Attorney's Office, and, 
in any event, all legal advice must be rendered under the authority of the City 
Attorney. 
Other serious conflict of interest issues arise in the way in which Ms. Howick's 
appeal has-been handled. The City labor relations officer at the time Ms. 
Howick's appeal was filed on September 10,2007, was Marco Kunz. Ms. 
Kunz took no action on the appeal and has now obtained Ms. Howick's former 
position as counsel for the Salt Lake City Department of Airports. Ms. 
Knighton, Ms. Kunz's former supervisor, then sent her letter purporting to 
deprive Ms. Howick of any right to appeal her discharge. 
The City's Conflict of Interest ordinance requires that City employees avoid 
even the appearance of impropriety and more specifically that when an 
individual employee's interests may be affected by a decision, that the conflict 
be disclosed and the employee not be involved in the decision. It further 
prohibits employees from using their positions to further their own or others 
professional interests. Salt Lake City Code, Sections 244.030 and 040. The 
Employee Appeals Board Procedures are also sensitive to issues of conflict of 
interest. For instance, they provide that the City labor relations officer must 
impanel Board members for an appeal who are least likely to have personal 
knowledge regarding the matter. See Section IV.B. Such attention to conflicts 
of interest does not appear to have been exercised at any point in the handling 
of Ms. Howick's appeal, and these facts raise serious questions. We are not 
aware of any conflict of interest waiver issued by the City in this matter, and, 
for the reasons set forth above, the City Attorney could not properly grant such 
a waiver in this matter. Salt Lake City Code, Section 2.44.180. 
We ask that the City follow its Procedures and comply with the law without the 
influence of the conflicts that have seriously affected Ms. Howick and impaired 
City processes. Further, as you and I discussed in connection with obtaining an 
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opinion prior to Ms. Knighton sending her letter because Mr. Rutan took the 
action being challenged in Ms. Howick's appeal, he has a conflict of interest in 
writing the required opinion. The opinion must therefore be provided by an 
unbiased and independent attorney knowledgeable in the law. 
Ms. Howick had been an outstanding City employee for 15 years until she was 
discharged based on an alleged at will status and informed that this was a 
business decision incident to a change in a department head. Ms. Howick has 
been trying to resolve this matter amicably through reinstatement to her 
employment and continues to believe this is possible and in the best interests of 
both parties. If the city will act in good faith and without conflicts of interest, 
this matter can be readily resolved. 
If it is the City's position that Ms. Knighton's letter is the final action or order 
of the Employee Appeals Board, does she intend to certify the decision to the 
City Recorder as required by Section I.G of the Procedures? If she does not 
and the City intends Ms. Knighton's September 21 letter to be the only and 
final action or order of the Employee Appeals Board and Salt Lake City, please 
let me know immediately and in writing so Ms. Howick can proceed with the 
appeal process. 
Very truly yours, 
Elizabetn T. Dunning 
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Attorneys at Law 
SALT LAKE CITY SENT VIA FACSIMILE 
AND U.S. MAIL 
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Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 






Thank you for your letter of today's date and for returning my telephone call to 
your office so promptly. As I told you when we spoke, it is important for Salt 
Lake City to clarify how it intends to handle Ms. Howick's appeal of her 
termination from this point. 
The Utah Municipal Code and the City's Employee Appeals Board Procedures 
make clear that the appeal of a termination is to be conducted and concluded 
promptly. Under the Utah Municipal Code, the employee has only ten days to 
file a notice of appeal with the city recorder. U.C.A. § 10-3-1106(3)(a). The 
Code requires the recorder to refer the matter to the appeal board "forthwith," 
and the appeal board must commence its investigation and hear the matter 
"forthwith." U.C.A. §10-3-1106(3)(b)(i) and (ii). The appeal board has only 
15 days from the date of the referral to certify its decision to the city recorder, 
unless for good cause and with the consent of the employee and the city, the 
board extends the time for certifying its decision to a "maximum" of 60 days. 
U.C.A. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) and (ii). Once the appeal board receives the appeal 
from the city recorder, if there is a question whether a City employee is within 
the class of persons who may appeal a discharge, the Board must request a legal 
opinion, ordinarily from the City Attorney. The City Attorney must render an 
opinion "no later than the next business day after a request is received." 
Employee Appeals Board Procedures, IH.G. 
Elizabeth T. Dunning elizabeth.dunning@hro.com 





Jodi Ho wick filed her Notice of Appeal on September 10, 2007 and presumably 
the City Recorder provided a copy of the appeal to the City labor relations 
officer the next day. We are therefore long past the 15 day period in which 
appeal boards are required to act in the absence of consent of the employee. 
We have no interest in filing a premature appeal. On the other hand, we are not 
willing to continue in limbo outside the process required by the Utah Municipal 
Code and the City's own ordinances, policies and procedures and without any 
time constraints on the City. For these reasons, it is important for us to know 
first, that Ms. Howick's appeal has now been referred to the Employee Appeals 
Board and second, whether you have been retained to provide the opinion 
contemplated by Section IILG of the City's Employee Appeals Board 
Procedures. If you have not been retained to provide that opinion, we would 
like to know whether the City has retained someone else to do so. 
I understand that you have only recently been retained by the City in this 
matter, but given the date of Jamey Knighton's letter, we need to resolve these 
issues by Monday, October 22, 2007. 
I look forward to talking with you on Monday. 




201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 















VIA FACSIMILE AND MAIL 521-9639 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
299 South Main St., Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Howick v. SLC Corporation 
Dear Elizabeth: 
I am writing to confirm a point we discussed in the telephone conversation we had 
yesterday. It is the position of the Salt Lake City Corporation that the letter from Jamey 
Knighton that you received on or about September 21, 2007 does not constitute a final 
action or order of the Employee Appeals Board under Section VIII of the Employee 
Appeals Board procedures or Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6). Accordingly, no 30-day 
period for appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals or other time limitation runs from the date of 
Ms. Knighton's letter. 
I look forward to receiving your letter containing your legal analysis of 
Ms. Howick's situation. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
avre 
WMG/cmg 
cc: Ralph E. Chamness, Esq. 
1012367.1 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 801.532.1234 
Facsimile 801.536.6111 
VIA FACSIMILE AND MAIL 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
299 South Main St., Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Howick v. SLC Corporation 
Dear Elizabeth: 
I am writing as a follow up to the telephone conservation we had on Friday 
afternoon. At that time I had sent you my letter of October 19, 2007 but had not received 
your letter of the same date. I read your letter this morning when I got into the office. 
When we spoke on Friday, you asked whether there would any formal action by the 
Employee Appeals Board (the "Board"). In your letter, you outline certain steps that you 
believe the Board would take in the case of an appeal to the Board. I have now reviewed 
the Board's policies and procedures and have concluded that the Board has no jurisdiction 
over the termination of Ms. Howick. She was an at-will employee and signed an at-will 
agreement in 1998. For your convenience, I enclose a copy of her at-will agreement. The 
Board's policies expressly state that they do not cover at-will employees: 
2. Employees Not Covered by this Policy 
2.1 This policy does not apply to at-will employees, who may be terminated 
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Holme, Roberts 
& Owen, LLP 
1012690.1 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
October 22, 2007 
Page Two 
Given that the Board's policies and procedures expressly state that they do not apply 
to at-will employees and given that Ms. Howick was a long-standing at-will employee, the 
Board would not have jurisdiction over Ms. Howick's tennination. Accordingly, the Board 
would not be in a position to take any formal action with regard to Ms. Howick's 
termination. 
Sincerely, 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
WMG/kr 
cc: Ralph E. Chamness, Esq. 
W. Mark Gavre 
1012690.1 
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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DISCLAIM^? 
CO 
I understand that, if I am appointed by the Salt Lake City Attorney to the 
"Appointed Senior City Attorney" position, my employment will be at-will 
and will be for no fixed length of time. 
I understand that no oral or written statements (in personnel manuals, 
policies, procedures, or elsewhere) or any conduct of the Mayor, City 
Attorney, or other City official at any time, other than in a written contract of 
employment signed by the Mayor or City Attorney, can create an express or 
implied contract to the contrary. 
^±0-
EXHIBIT D 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
BEFORE 
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD 
NAME OF APPLICANT: JodiHowick 
ADDRESS OF APPLICANT: c/o Elizabeth Dunning, Esq. RECEIVED 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
299 S. Main * - p - fl _ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 OtT • U IWI 
TELEPHONE: 521-5800 (Ms. Dunning's phone number) CITY RECORDER 
DEPARTMENT: Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
ACTION BEING APPEALED: 
Brief description of action: Discharge. 
Date of action being appealed: August 31, 2007. 
Person who took action: Edwin Rutan 
APPELLANT WILL BE REPRESENTED BY: Elizabeth Dunning, Holme Roberts & 
Owen, LLP. 
SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL: 
Appellant worked for Salt Lake City Corporation for fifteen years with numerous City 
managers, and she received outstanding performance evaluations. Appellant was 
verbally informed by her supervisor that she would be discharged as of August 31,2007, 
without any prior notice and without any cause. As the basis for this action, Appellant's 
supervisor relied on Appellant's alleged at-will employment status created by the City 
contrary to the requirements imposed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 1106 and 
other laws and policies. Also contrary to those provisions, Appellant's supervisor 
indicated that his decision was a business decision incident to changes in a department 
head, and the decision may also have been affected by issues incident to changes in 
elective officers and otherwise contrary to law and policy. Appellant's supervisor 
provided no other basis for the decision and no documentation in connection with the 
decision. Appellant respectfully requests reinstatement to her employment based on the 
following: 
#229214 vl 
Appellant's at-will employment status was not lawfully created under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 1106 and other laws and policies, and Appellant is 
entitled to the protections of those statutes, laws and policies. 
Among other things, the action taken was contrary to the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 1106 and other laws and policies as a discharge 
without any notice and without any cause, and as a discharge incident to changes 
in a department head and/or elective officers. 
WITNESSES YOU MAY HAVE TESTIFY ON APPEAL: 
Edwin Rutan 
City Attorney's Office 
535-7788 
Ralph Chamness 
City Attorney's Office 
535-7788 
Dennis Ferguson 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
521-5678 
Others as may be identified during a discovery process. 
DOCUMENTS YOU INTEND TO INTRODUCE AT THE HEARING 
Performance evaluations given to Appellant and letter of recognition. 
Documents as may be identified during a discovery process. 
WHAT ACTION DO YOU WANT THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD TO TAKE: 
Appellant respectfully requests reinstatement to her employment with full back pay and 
benefits. 
I hereby request a hearing before the Employee Appeals Board. 
Signatut^of App^llint Date 
#229214 vl 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review 
Employee Name: 
Job Title: 
Review Period Start: 
Review Period End: 
Reviewer: 
JODIL.HOWICK 





Goals covered within the review period. 
Section Weight: 50% 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
Airport penalty processes (part 1) 5.00 Outstanding performance 




Review current penalty and official decision making structures used by the Airport, and reuse 
these structures to enhance the legal and operational needs of those processes 
Measurement: Review current structures. Identify areas where changes would better address 
Airport legal and operational needs. Prepare policies, ordinances and other documents needed to 
make changes. Implement the changes. 
Airport services organization 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2006 
Weight: 14% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Determine the most appropriate methods for organizing airport profit-generating 
rights and services, such as a services corporation, and implement that method. 
Measurement: Review possible structures and identify best method. Implement method by 
preparing governing documents and required practices. 
AUA preparation 5.00 Outstanding performance 




Compile and review use agreement options that may be advisable for upcoming carrier 
negotiations. Prepare a proposed draft recommending text that reflects best practices and updated 
legal provisions. Assist with negotiation efforts. 
Measurement: Compile documents from other airports that I don't already have. Prepare outline 
identifying and recommending potential provisions. Prepare draft of a new agreement for review 
by Airport management. 
Contract forms revisions (part 1) 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2006 
Weight: 14% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Review form documents used for Airport contracts. Identify need for additional 
forms. Prepare standardized language for common provisions based on current law and best 
practices. Write form specific provisions based on current law and best practices. Prepare and 
issue new forms, and maintain official copies. 
Measurement: Compile a list of forms and identify needs for new forms. Complete 
standardized sections for City and federal requirements, and common boiler provisions. 
Complete rewrites for leasing and real property forms. 
Implement Airport policy system (part 2) 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2006 
Weight: 15% 
Category: Workforce Quality 
Description: Work with procurement committee to create a program using factors such as living 
wages that will benefit City procurement. 
Measurement: Finalize program in accordance with the Mayor's schedule. Incorporate all 
factors for consideration. Create a program that will withstand legal challenge. 
Pursue Airport legislative issues 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2006 
Weight: 14% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Identify legislative needs (federal, state and local). Prepare text, and work with the 
legislative process to obtain passage of issues. 
Measurement: Draft text, and obtain passage of bills and ordinances presented. 
Pursue Kern River Ltigation (part 2) 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2006 
Weight: 15% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Pursue the needs of the litigation to defend the City's interests. Pursue settlement 
options as they may become available. Manage outside counsel and direct the case, and prepare 
documents and strategies in support of the case. 
Measurement: Respond to all case deadlines. Manage costs effectively. Obtain best available 
court rulings. Provide documents and advice in support of settlement discussions. 
Competencies 5.00 
Competencies selected by Airport and Division management 




Fosters quality focus in others 
Sets clear quality requirements 
Measures key outcomes 
Solicits and applies customer feedback 
Improves processes, products, and services 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Because JODI is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality. 
She sots quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates 
provide thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. JODI proactively gathers and 
incorporates feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward 
the improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding. 
Leadership 
Weight: 20% 
Exhibits confidence in self and others 
Inspires respect and trust 
Reacts well under pressure 
Shows courage to take action 
Motivates others to perform well 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other 
people's abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other 
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong 
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best 
performance from others. 
Adaptability 
Weight: 20% 
Adapts to changes in the work environment 
Manages competing demands 
Accepts criticism and feedback 
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI is flexible and innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the 
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands 
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her 




Displays courtesy and sensitivity 
Responds promptly to service requests 
Identifies customer needs 
Explains services clearly 
Handles difficult situations 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is 
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs 
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise 




5.00 Outstanding performance 
Competent in required job skills and knowledge 5 Outstanding performance 
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills 5 Outstanding performance 
Keeps abreast of current developments 5 Outstanding performance 
Requires minimal supervision J Outstanding performance 
Displays understanding of how job relates to others 5 Outstanding performance 
Uses resources effectively 5 Outstanding performance 
Her expert level of knowledge and job skill enable her to frequently exceed the job requirements. 
JODI shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually monitors 
developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it. Her 
thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no 
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job 
relates to others. JODI obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to 
her. 
Summary 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Summarizes performance during the review period. 
Development Plans 




I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means 
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree 
with the evaluation. 
Employee Sigtfciture/lJbtg 
J&oWt n?~- l^-r-Oo 
Reviewer Signatun 
Next Level Signature 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review 
Employee Name: 
Job Title: Executive Director 
Review Period Start: 1/1/2005 
Review Period End: 12/31/2005 
Reviewer: Russell Pack 
Goals 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Goals covered within the review period. 
Section Weight: 50% 
Airport penalty processes (part 1) 5.00 Outstanding performance 




Review current penalty and official decision making structures used by the Airport, and reuse 
these structures to enhance the legal and operational needs of those processes. 
Measurement: Review current structures. Identify areas where changes would better address 
Airport legal and operational needs. Prepare policies, ordinances and other documents needed to 
make changes. Implement the changes. 
Airport services organization 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2005 
Weight: 14% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Determine the most appropriate methods for organizing airport profit-generating 
rights and services, such as a services corporation, and implement that method. 
Measurement: Review possible structures and identify best method. Implement method by 
preparing governing documents and required practices. 
AUA preparation 5.00 Outstanding performance 




Compile and review use agreement options that may be advisable for upcoming carrier 
negotiations. Prepare a proposed draft recommending text that reflects best practices and updated 
legal provisions. Assist with negotiation efforts. 
Measurement: Compile documents from other airports that I don't already have. Prepare outline 
identifying and recommending potential provisions. Prepare draft of a new agreement for review 
by Airport management. 
Contract forms revisions (part 1) 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2005 
Weight: 14% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Review form documents used for Airport contracts. Identify need for additional 
forms. Prepare standardized language for common provisions based on current law and best 
practices. Write form specific provisions based on current law and best practices. Prepare and 
issue new forms, and maintain official copies. 
Measurement: Compile a list of forms and identify needs for new forms. Complete 
standardized sections for City and federal requirements, and common boiler provisions. 
Complete rewrites for leasing and real property forms. 
Implement Airport policy system (part 2) 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2005 
Weight: 15% 
Category: Workforce Quality 
Description: Work with procurement committee to create a program using factors such as living 
wages that will benefit City procurement. 
Measurement: Finalize program in accordance with the Mayor's schedule. Incorporate all 
factors for consideration. Create a program that will withstand legal challenge. 
Pursue-Airport legislative issues 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2005 
Weight: 14% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Identify legislative needs (federal, state and local). Prepare text, and work with the 
legislative process to obtain passage of issues. 
Measurement: Draft text, and obtain passage of bills and ordinances presented. 
Pursue Kern River Litigation (part 2) 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2005 
Weight: 15% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Pursue the needs of the litigation to defend the City's interests. Pursue settlement 
options as they may become available. Manage outside counsel and direct the case, and prepare 
documents and strategies in support of the case. 
Measurement: Respond to all case deadlines. Manage costs effectively. Obtain best available 
court rulings. Provide documents and advice in support of settlement discussions. 
Competencies 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Competencies selected by Airport and Division management. 
Section Weight: 50% 
Quality Management 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Weight: 20% 
Fosters quality focus in others 5 Outstanding performance 
Sets clear quality requirements 5 Outstanding performance 
Measures key outcomes 
Solicits and applies customer feedback 
Improves processes, products, and services 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Because JODI is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality. 
She sets quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates 
provide thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. JODI proactively gathers and 
incorporates feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward 
the improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding. 
Leadership 
Weight: 20% 
Exhibits confidence in self and others 
Inspires respect and trust 
Reacts well underpressure 
Shows courage to take action 
Motivates others to perform well 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other 
peopled abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other 
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong 
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best 
performance from others. 
Adaptability 
Weight: 20% 
Adapts to changes in the work environment 
Manages competing demands 
Accepts criticism and feedback 
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI is flexible and innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the 
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands 
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her 




Displays courtesy and sensitivity 
Responds promptly to service requests 
Identifies customer needs 
Explains services clearly 
Handles difficult situations 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is 
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs 
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise 
and easy to understand. JODI excels at resolving the most difficult or emotional customer 
situations. 
Job Knowledge 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Weight: 20% 
Competent in required job skills and knowledge 5 Outstanding performance 
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills 5 Outstanding performance 
Keeps abreast of current developments 5 Outstanding performance 
Requires minimal supervision 5 Outstanding performance 
Displays understanding of how job relates to others 5 Outstanding performance 
Uses resources effectively 5 Outstanding performance 
Her expert level of knowledge and job skills enables her to frequently exceed the job 
requirements. JODI shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually 
monitors developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it. 
Her thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no 
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job 
relates to others. JODI obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to her. 
Summary 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Summarizes performance during the review period. 
Development Plans 




I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means 
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree 
with the evaluation. 
\«F*A^Q 
Reviewer Signature/Date 
Next Level Signature ' 
K5 
O 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review 
Employee Name: JODIL. HOWICK 
Job Title: Appt Sr. City Atty. 
Review Period Start: 1/1/2004 
Review Period End: 12/31/2004 
Reviewer: Tim Campbell 
Goals 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Goals covered within the review period. 
Section Weight: 50% 
Airline bankruptcy preparations 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2004 
Weight: 16% 
Category: Financial 
Description: Review Delta's arrangements with the Airport, and those of other carriers in or 
nearing bankruptcy. Address issues that can be structured to create more favorable results in 
bankruptcy. Monitor carrier activities. 
Measurement: Monitor carrier account balances and advise on collection activities to maintain 
accounts at no more than 30 days. Create a list of all Delta contracts with the Airport and 
recommend any needed changes under those agreements. Recommend and/or take actions on 
other issues. 
Create City Value-Based Procurement Pro 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2004 
Weight: 17% 
Category: Customer 
Description: Work with procurement committee to create a program using factors such as living 
wages that will benefit City procurement. 
Measurement: 
Finalize program in accordance with the Mayor's schedule. Incorporate all factors for 
consideration. Create a program that will withstand legal challenge. 
Finalize adoption of Airport Use Agreeme 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2004 
Weight: 17% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Assist with issues arising as AUAs are signed. Draft Supplemental Agreements 
needed to implement loading bridge arrangements. 
Measurement: All AUA signed. All Supplemental Agreements signed. 
Implement Airport policy system 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2004 
Weight: 17% 
Category: Workforce Quality 
Description: Create a system that facilitates policy adoption at the Airport. Draft forms and 
guidelines, and work with each Airport division to discuss responsibilities for policy adoption and 
the maintenance of policies. Initiate process to work with each division to revise the current 
manual and address their needs. 
Measurement: 
Draft form and guidance documents. Meet with each division to kick off the process. Provide 
legal review for policies submitted. Compile and maintain the policy book. 
Pursue Airport legislative issues 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2004 
Weight: 16% 
Category: Financial 
Description: Identify legislative needs (federal, state and local). Prepare text, and work with the 
legislative process to obtain passage of issues. 
Measurement: Draft text, and obtain passage of bills and ordinances presented. 
Pursue Kern River Litigation 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 12/31/2004 
Weight: 17% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Pursue needs of the litigation to defend the City's interest. Pursue settlement 
options as they may become available. Manage outside counsel and direct the case, and prepare 
documents and strategies in support of the case. 
Measurement: 
Respond to all case deadlines. Manage costs effectively. Obtain best available court rulings. 
Provide documents and advice in support of settlement discussions. 
Competencies 5.00 
Competencies selected by Airport and Division management. 
Outstanding performance 
Section Weight: 50% 
Quality Management 
Weight: 20% 
Fosters quality focus in others 
Sets clear quality requirements 
Measures key outcomes 
Solicits and applies customer feedback 
Improves processes, products, and services 
5.00 Outstanding p erf or man ce 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Because JODI is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality. 
She sets quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates 
provide thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. JODI proactively gathers and 
incorporates feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward 
the improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding. 
Leadership 
Weight: 20% 
Exhibits confidence in self and others 
Inspires respect and trust 
Reacts well under pressure 
Shows courage to take action 
Motivates others to perform well 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other 
people's abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other 
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong 
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best 
performance from others. 
Adaptability 
Weight: 20% 
Adapts to changes in the work environment 
Manages competing demands 
Accepts criticism and feedback 
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
JODI is flexible and innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the 
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands 
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her 
performance. JODI smoothly adapts her approach to meet the needs of any situation she 
encounters. 
Customer Focus 5.00 Outstanding performan ce 
Weight: 20% 
Displays courtesy and sensitivity 5 Outstanding performance 
Responds promptly to service requests 5 Outstanding performance 
Identifies customer needs 5 Outstanding performance 
Explains services clearly 5 Outstanding performance 
Handles difficult situations 5 Outstanding performance 
JODI treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is 
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs 
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise 
and easy to understand. JODI excels at resolving the most difficult or emotional customer 
situations. 
Job Knowledge 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Weight: 20% 
Competent in required job skills and knowledge 5 Outstanding performance 
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills 5 Outstanding performance 
Keeps abreast of current developments 5 Outstanding performance 
Requires minimal supervision 5 Outstanding performance 
Displays understanding of how job relates to others J Outstanding performance 
Uses resources effectively 5 Outstanding performance 
Her expert level of knowledge and job skill enable her to frequently exceed the job requirements. 
JODI shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually monitors 
developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it. Her 
thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no 
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job 
relates to others. JODI obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to 
her. 
Summary 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Summarizes performance during the review period. 
Development Plans 




I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means 
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree 
with the evaluation. 
Next Level Signature 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review 
Employee Name: JODIL. HOWICK 
Job Title: Appt. Sr. City Atty. 
Review Period Start: 1 /1/2003 
Review Period End: 12/31/2003 
Reviewer: Timothy Campbell 
Goals 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Goals covered within the review period. 
Section Weight: 50% 
AIR-Legal-Establish Service Priorities 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 6/30/2003 
Weight: 12% 
Category: Customer 
Description: Work with Airport divisions to establish legal service priorities. 
Measurement: 
Produce a white paper regarding division needs and priorities 
AIR-Legal-Establish Service Priorities-2 5.00 Outstanding performance 




Provide timely and accurate support to the Airport's contract administration processes. 
Measurement: 
Compile data re: needs, actions, turn-around times and tracking methods, and determine best 
practices. 
AIR-Legal-Facilitate policy implement 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 6/30/2003 
Weight: 13% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Facilitate the Airport's adoption and use of departmental rules and policies, and 
work toward implementation 
Measurement: 
Develop and implement an interim legal review and adoption process, and develop a white paper 
regarding overall structural needs 
AIR-Legal-Facilitate policy implement.-2 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 6/30/2003 
Weight: 12% 
Category: Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Description: Structure appropriate contractual relationships with the airlines, and work toward 
implementation with Airport staff 
Measurement: 
Produce a base negotiations document with negotiation options. 
AIR-Legal-Protect Airport Assets 5.00 Outstanding performance 




Review and revise measures in Airport contracts and practices to protect Airport assets against 
financial risk. 
Measurement: 
Prepare list of enhanced terms and practices, and follow an implementation schedule. 
AIR-Legal-Protect Airport Assets-2 5.00 Outstanding performance 




Review and revise contract language and legal processes to enhance the Airport's ability to 
recover sums due. 
Measurement: Prepare list of enhanced terms and practices, and follow an implementation 
schedule. 
AIR-Legal-Pursue Training Resources 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 6/30/2003 
Weight: 13% 
Category: Workforce Quality 
Description: Identify and pursue training and resources that will enhance effectiveness 
Measurement: 
Track training and resource use and determine its effectiveness 
AIR-Legal-Pursue training resources-2 5.00 Outstanding performance 
Due Date: 6/30/2003 
Weight: 12% 
Category: Workforce Quality 
Description: 
Continue to make the work environment pleasant 
Measurement: 
Celebrate special occasions as a staff at least once a month 
Competencies 5.00 
Competencies selected by Airport and Division management. 
Outstanding performance 
Section Weight: 50% 
Quality Management 
Weight: 20% 
Fosters quality focus in others 
Sets clear quality requirements 
Measures key outcomes 
Solicits and applies customer feedback 
Improves processes, products, and services 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Because Jodi is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality. She 
sets quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates provide 
thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. Jodi proactively gathers and incorporates 
feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward the 
improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding. 
Leadership 
Weight: 20% 
Exhibits confidence in self and others 
Inspires respect and trust 
Reacts well under pressure 
Shows courage to take action 
Motivates others to perform well 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Jodi maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other 
people's abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other 
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong 
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best 
performance from others. 
Adaptability 
Weight: 20% 
Adapts to changes in the work environment 
Manages competing demands 
Accepts criticism and feedback 
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Jodi is flexible and innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the 
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands 
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her 




Displays courtesy and sensitivity 
Responds promptly to service requests 
Identifies customer needs 
Explains services clearly 
Handles difficult situations 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Jodi treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is 
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs 
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise 




Competent in required job skills and knowledge 
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills 
Keeps abreast of current developments 
Requires minimal supervision 
Displays understanding of how job relates to others 
Uses resources effectively 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
5 Outstanding performance 
Her expert level of knowledge and job skill enable her to frequently exceed the job requirements. 
Jodi shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually monitors 
developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it. Her 
thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no 
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job 
relates to others. Jodi obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to her. 
Summary 
Summarizes performance during the review period. 
5.00 Outstanding performance 
Development Plans 
Plan developed and agreed upon to enhance employee career movement. 
Strengths to build on 
1 - Continue ACI involvement 
2 - ABA Air & Space Forum editorial board 




I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means 
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree 
with the evaluation. 
.5- rr^JL 2g*W 
Reviewer Signature/Dqjtc1^ 
c ,^ —^- ^^ 
Next Level Signature 
DHEDEE CORRADINI '.lavor 
^ V - A A C f LOUISE MILLEfi Execunve Director 
^ 4 U ^ July 12, 1994 
Mr, Roger Cutler, Esq. 
City Attorney 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
451 South State Street, Room 505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Roger: 
Jodi provided me with a copy of the "Highlights from 1993-94" 
that she submitted to you regarding the work she performed for the 
Salt Lake City Airport Authority. Obviously, it is difficult to 
summarize accomplishments for an entire year in a two page 
memorandum; however, she has hit on the highlights from last year. 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with my comments 
regarding Jodi's performance. She is one of the most responsible 
and dedicated individuals I have had the pleasure of working with. 
Assignments are completed in a timely manner with thorough research 
and a reasonable basis for the conclusions presented. Jodi is 
willing to put in the necessary time to complete projects with very 
compressed schedules to meet the demanding requirements of 
operating a major large hub airport, served by two reliever 
airports. The Salt Lake City Airport Authority is continually 
recognized for outstanding performance in many areas and Jodi's 
contributions to our success are significant. 
I appreciate you recognizing the tremendous demands we face 
regarding full time, in-house legal counsel, over and above the 
requirements we have for litigation support, condemnation 
proceedings, insurable liability claims, employment issues and 
particular issues requiring specific legal expertise. Having Jodi 
available at all times has certainly made my job easier and 
provides me the opportunity to make critical decisions, that have 
legal implications, in a timely matter to better serve our tenants 
and the travelling public. 
Thanks again for your support of the Airport Authority's 
programs and I look forward to another productive and successful 
year. 
Sincerely, 
Louis E. M i l l e r 
cutler 
3oard 
Annette P Cumnung Chatf D:nL Skaggs 
Curtis E Ackeriind j r Roger M Smedley 
E J "Jake* Gam Richard R Sterner 
Peter R. Huntsman Elaine B. Wets 
Eddie P Mayne 
Salt Lake City Airport Authority 
AMF Box 22084, Salt Lake City, Utah 84122 
801.575.2400 Fax:801-575.2679 
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Job Code 4 206 
To finalize an employee evaluation the following sheet should be canpleted and 
the original returned to the Office of Personnel Management, The department 
should retain the yellow copy for its records* Completed employee evaluation 
sheets (Job Skills and Behaviors) should be kept by the department. They should 
not be sent to the personnel department unless requested by the supervisor or em-
£loyee. 
Weight 
L e g a l w r i t i n g 1. 20% 
L e g a l r e a s o n i n g ^ 20% 
D e p t . knowledge** 20% 
S t r a t e g y & t a c t i c s 20% 


























If you approve granting the 
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Elizabeth T. Dunning, Esq. (#3896) FILES DISTRICT COURT 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP r:_£0 ThirC Judicial District 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 UTAH APPELLATE COURTS QCJ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2263 OCT 2 ? flffl? 
Telephone: (801) 521 -5800 ""' ey. SALT UKE COUNTY 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9639 
Attorneys for Petitioner 




SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Notice is hereby given that Petitioner Jodi Howick, by her attorney Elizabeth T. 
Dunning, pursuant to U.C.A. 10-3-1106 appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final 
action or order on the appeal of Petitioner to the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board 
entered in this matter by letter to Petitioner from the City Labor Relations Officer, dated 
September 21,2007. 
The appeal is taken from the entire final action or order. 
Dated this SLot"^  day of October, 2007. 
'xooofcLT 
Elizaheih T. Dunning 
Attorney for Petitioner Jodi 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this ^Qs^ day of October, 2007, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was served by U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, as follows: 
W. Mark Gavre 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 





SAM GUEVARA **£&& \2®2™J MKKUL M^M^a^*«^l*^SI RALPH BECKER 
DIRECTOR, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT D E P A R T M E N T O F M A N A G E M E N T S E R V I C E S MAYOR 
DIVISION OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
August 7,2008 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Holme Roberts & Owens, L.L.P. 
299 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Requested Documentation 
Dear Ms. Dunning, 
Enclosed is the documentation you requested concerning the Jodi Howick appeal. 
Sincerely, 
Shelly Chapman 
Human Resource Consultant 
Cc: W. Mark Gavre 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edwin P. Rutan, II 
City Attorney 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
Human Resources 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
4 5 1 S O U T H STATE STREET, ROOM 1 1 5 , SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH B41 1 4 - 5 4 6 4 
MAIL ING A D D R E S S : P.O. BOX 1 4 5 4 6 4 , SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH B41 1 4 - 5 4 6 4 
T E L E P H O N E : BO 1 - 5 3 5 - 7 9 0 O FAX: 8 0 1 - 5 3 5 - 6 6 1 4 
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